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ABSTRACT 
In order to provide for its future security, Bosnia and Herzegovina aspires to 
NATO membership.  It intends to be not only a consumer of security, but also a provider 
of security for its allies.  Because of the history and specific regional context of its 
relations with its neighbors, Bosnia and Herzegovina faces many obstacles. Although 
Bosnia and Herzegovina is still engaged in a stabilization and reconstruction process, 
Sarajevo is trying to find the best possible way to achieve the goal of NATO 
membership.  This thesis analyzes the main obstacles on the way to NATO membership, 
identifies ways to surmount them, and offers some recommendations for future policy.  
This thesis will, it is hoped, be beneficial to policymakers, who need to promote focused 
and united national efforts and to generate synergy to help Bosnia and Herzegovina 
successfully achieve NATO membership and thereby secure a better future for the 
country and Europe as a whole. 
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After the fall of the Soviet empire, Europe found itself in a totally new security 
environment. Events in 1989-1991, including the fall of the Berlin Wall and the 
disintegration of the Soviet Union, immediately raised the question of the relevance of 
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in the future security framework of 
Europe.  With regard to the security issue, NATO successfully resolved its identity crisis, 
performed essential consolidation and reorganization, and continued with new roles, 
thereby serving as a central pillar of security and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area.   
“These new roles can be defined and categorized in various ways, but the two most 
significant new roles are clearly cooperation with former adversaries and other non–
NATO countries in new institutions such as Partnership for Peace, and crisis management 
and peace operations beyond the territory of NATO allies.”1 
In order to enjoy the benefits of collective defense provided by NATO, Bosnia 
and Herzegovina has struggled to contribute to the Alliance’s collective defense posture 
and to join NATO as soon as possible.  NATO and Bosnia and Herzegovina have had 
much in common in recent history and may well have a shared future. NATO’s initial 
post-Cold War transformation took place during the Bosnian tragedy in 1991-1995 and 
proved successful in charting a new course towards the future for the newly transformed 
NATO alliance.  Following the United Nations (UN) mission failure in Bosnia in the 
early 1990s, Bosnia and Herzegovina saw NATO as the only intergovernmental 
organization capable of providing security to its citizens in the future.  Looking to the 
past and hoping for a better future, Bosnia and Herzegovina has made a logical choice: to 
seek membership in the NATO alliance in order to enjoy the benefits of collective 
defense. 
                                                 
1David S. Yost, NATO Transformed: The Alliance's New Roles in International Security (Washington, 
DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1998), 72.  
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Participation in Partnership for Peace (PfP) is broadly understood by the people of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina as the first important step towards NATO membership.  NATO 
gained three new partners on 14 December 2006, with the accession of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Montenegro, and Serbia to the Alliance’s PfP program.  Speaking of the 
new relationship with these three countries, NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop 
Scheffer said, “This marks a moment and a beginning of much wider cooperation.”  
Nebojša Radmanović, the Chairman of the Tripresidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
said, “The fact that Bosnia and Herzegovina is [has] joined the Partnership for Peace 
Programme is probably one of the biggest steps that Bosnia and Herzegovina has 
undertaken in its past with Euro-Atlantic integration….  We are quite aware that this is 
the first step and that it means that we have to take more effort towards going to Euro-
Atlantic integration, and we want to do so.”2 
Bosnia and Herzegovina must put forth significant effort towards pursuing NATO 
membership.  There would be many benefits on each side, but there are also many 
obstacles that must be overcome in order to achieve the goal. Furthermore, it is not 
accidental that these three countries were invited to join the PfP program at the same 
time.  Their relations have been influenced by a common history, a shared geography, 
and many other factors that have shaped their destiny and that at the same time have 
erected some obstacles on their way to Euro-Atlantic integration.  Even though the 
NATO membership process is not solely a Bosnian responsibility, the majority of effort 
regarding this process has to be accomplished by the government and people of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina. 
B. LITERATURE REVIEW AND RESEARCH QUESTION 
In order to answer the questions “why” and “how” in the enlargement process, in 
September 1995 the Alliance published its Study on NATO Enlargement.3  The principles 
                                                 
2NATO Update: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro and Serbia Join NATO Partnership for Peace 
(Brussels:  NATO, 2006); http://www.nato.int/docu/update/2006/12-december/e1214a.htm (accessed 9 May 
2008).  
3NATO Basic Texts: Study on NATO Enlargement (Brussels: North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 
September 1995), http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/enl-9501.htm (accessed 19 April 2008).  
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articulated in the study constitute the basis of NATO’s approach to inviting new 
members.  Regarding the question “why,” the answer was strengthening security in the 
entire Euro-Atlantic region without creating new dividing lines.  The answer to the 
question “how” regarding enlargement reaffirms that future enlargement decisions will be 
made in accordance with Article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty.  This study offers a road 
map of what NATO requires from potential candidates for membership.  This thesis relies 
on the Study on NATO Enlargement as a principal source as to NATO policy and as a 
type of conceptual literature in this research.  
The existing empirical literature generally relates to the analysis of the war in 
Bosnia and its role in the transformation process of NATO. David S. Yost has broadly 
analyzed the challenges of NATO enlargement and provided an assessment of NATO 
transformation processes and relationships with other international organizations.  His 
works provide a point of departure for research about NATO and the potential candidacy 
of Bosnia and Herzegovina for NATO membership.  According to Yost, the stakes in 
Bosnia for the future of the Alliance are immense because of the large investment of U.S. 
and Allied political capital and credibility.  He further stressed this significance when he 
cited Walter Slocombe's remarks in 1996: 
Just as the NATO-Russia relationship is being forged in Bosnia, so too is 
the future of NATO itself. It is in Bosnia where all sixteen members of 
NATO, each one making a contribution, are sending the message that 
NATO is the bedrock on which the future security and stability of Europe 
will be built. It is in Bosnia that we are demonstrating that NATO can 
meet new challenges. It is in Bosnia where NATO is first reaping the 
benefits of joint peacekeeping training with our new Peace Partners. It is 
in Bosnia where future NATO members are showing themselves ready 
and able to shoulder the burdens of membership. And it is in Bosnia where 
we are showing that we can work together as partners with Russian forces. 
It is in Bosnia that NATO is working also with neutral and other non-
European states in an enterprise that affects global security.4 
                                                 
4Walter B. Slocombe, then the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, remarks to the Atlantic Council, 
14 June 1996, text furnished by the Department of Defense, p.17, quoted in Yost, NATO Transformed: The 
Alliance's New Roles in International Security, 227.  
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There is a consensus in the literature that the stakes in Bosnia for the future of the 
Alliance are substantial, and that Bosnia is going to be a significant part of that future.  
However, the more relevant question is how policy makers can ensure Bosnia’s timely 
admission and integration into NATO.  
Jeffrey Simon has analyzed the road map for NATO accession and the importance 
of the Partnership for Peace (PfP) and the Membership Action Plan (MAP).  Having 
assessed the MAP’s impact on new members, he concluded in 2001: 
In the defense and military spheres, all MAP members are hampered by 
limited resources and are struggling with force restructuring. Most MAP 
members made genuine efforts to commit human resources and improve 
interdepartmental coordination, but their defense efforts varied, and 
significant progress is still required.5 
Given the experience of other countries, the preparation of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina for NATO membership will probably not be a simple or easy matter. 
David Greenwood and the staff of the Centre for European Security Studies in the 
Netherlands in 2005 analyzed the western Balkan candidates for NATO membership and 
partnership and concluded that Bosnia and Herzegovina had sufficient credentials to enter 
the PfP program. They also concluded: 
As for BiH’s [Bosnia and Herzegovina's] longer-term NATO membership 
aspirations, we think that once the PfP hurdle has been surmounted the 
country – with help from its friends – could progress to MAP-state status 
fairly quickly, thanks to the impressive DRC [Defense Reform 
Commission]-led transformation that has taken place since 2003 and is, 
indeed, a continuing process.6 
Finally, The Path to Partnership for Peace prepared in 2003 by the Defense 
Reform Commission for the High Representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina, elaborated 
                                                 
5Jeffrey Simon, Roadmap to NATO Accession: Preparing for Membership (Washington, DC:  Institute 
for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, 2001), 8; 
http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS17833 (accessed 9 May 2008).  
6Staff of the Centre for European Security Studies, The Western Balkan Candidates for NATO 
Membership and Partnership, ed. David Greenwood (The Netherlands: Centre for European Security 
Studies, 2005), 84; http://www.cess.org/publications/harmoniepapers/pdfs/HarmPap.18.colour.pdf (accessed 11 
June 2008).  
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PfP benefits and NATO membership requirements for Bosnia and Herzegovina in order 
to stress the importance and necessity of defense reform for future NATO membership. 
This report provides relevant analysis about the forthcoming challenges for Bosnia and 
Herzegovina on its way to NATO membership.7  
In order to fill the gap in the existing literature about the prospects for NATO 
membership for Bosnia and Herzegovina, the broad research question examined in this 
thesis is the following: What are the possible obstacles facing Bosnia and Herzegovina as 
it pursues NATO membership, and what are the most effective solutions to overcome 
these obstacles? In order to answer this broad question this thesis addresses the following 
more specific questions:  What are the main challenges in the NATO enlargement 
process and how are they related to the aspirations of Bosnia and Herzegovina for NATO 
membership?  What impact could defense reform have on the NATO membership 
process?  How can Bosnia and Herzegovina become not only a consumer of security, but 
also a provider of security for its allies?  How have relations between the particular case 
study countries − Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina − and neighboring countries 
changed since the early 1990s?  Finally, to what extent do the previous disputes among 
them have implications for the NATO membership process?  
C. METHODOLOGY 
In order to answer these questions, this thesis relies on a qualitative comparative 
method.  The central focus resides in an analysis and comparison of Croatia and Bosnia 
and Herzegovina as case studies.  Data collection has been accomplished through a 
literature survey and via background interviews with NATO experts and with 
representatives of the government and Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
(AFBIH).  Croatia has been chosen for a comparative case study because of the similarity 
in the size of its territory and population with those of Bosnia and Herzegovina and its 
common history within the same geo-strategic space.8  Croatia is an example of a 
                                                 
7Defense Reform Commission, The Path to Partnership for Peace (Sarajevo: OSCE, 2003), 
http://www.oscebih.org/documents/12-eng.pdf (accessed 9 May 2008).  
8See Appendix A, Figure 1.  Map of Former Yugoslavia. 
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successful neighboring country on its way to NATO membership.9  The thesis first 
analyzes the challenges of the NATO enlargement process and its implications for 
possible NATO membership for Bosnia and Herzegovina.  These two case studies are 
then compared through an evaluation of two main variables which have a direct influence 
on this process: defense reform and the foreign policies of these countries.  
1.  Defense reform in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina as case study 
countries and its impact on prospects for NATO membership  
Defense reform, as one of the most successful reforms accomplished in Croatia 
and Bosnia and Herzegovina following the 1995 Dayton agreement, was undertaken in an 
exceptionally complicated internal political environment which will influence the future 
as well.  In its examination of defense reform in these two countries, this thesis identifies 
the main achievements thus far, analyzes its impact on the NATO membership process, 
and compares the defense reform activities in Bosnia and Herzegovina to those which 
have already been conducted in Croatia.  This enables the thesis to specify the remaining 
challenges for the future.  
2. Foreign policies of these countries and the implications for NATO 
membership prospects  
The main points of interest include efforts to resolve existing disputes with 
neighboring countries, the impact of Kosovo’s future status on the NATO membership 
process, and cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY) in The Hague as longstanding obligations of these countries in the 
wake of the Balkan conflicts of the 1990s.  These two factors, defense reform and foreign 
policy, are analyzed as separate but interrelated independent variables affecting the 
NATO membership process, which is the dependent variable.  
This thesis is organized as follows. Chapter II reviews the NATO enlargement 
process and how Bosnia and Herzegovina fits into this process.  Chapters III and IV 
examine Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina as case studies.  The analysis concentrates 
                                                 
9 The North Atlantic Council invited Albania and Croatia to begin accession talks to join the Alliance 
at the Bucharest Summit in April 2008. 
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on defense reform and the foreign policies of these countries.  It assesses the impact of 
these variables on prospects for NATO membership.  Chapter V offers a comparative 
analysis of these two case studies.  Chapter VI presents conclusions about the obstacles 
and challenges facing Bosnia and Herzegovina on its way to NATO membership, as well 
as recommendations about how to surmount these obstacles. 
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II. NATO ENLARGEMENT PROCESS 
A.  INTRODUCTION 
Having committed itself to gradual enlargement in 1994, NATO reaffirmed its 
open door policy in order to make a contribution to security in the North Atlantic area. 
The NATO enlargement process supports the Alliance’s basic goal of enhancing security 
and extending stability throughout the Euro-Atlantic area. Bosnia and Herzegovina is 
trying to find the best possible way to actively engage in this process in order to achieve 
the goal of NATO membership. This chapter analyzes the process of NATO enlargement, 
including its mechanisms and key issues in the process affecting Bosnia and 
Herzegovina's bid for NATO membership. This chapter concludes with an assessment of 
how Bosnia and Herzegovina fits into the NATO enlargement process. 
 B. BACKGROUND 
The bottom line is clear:  Expanding NATO will enhance our security. It is 
the right thing to do....  We must not fail history's challenge at this 
moment to build a Europe peaceful, democratic, and undivided, allied with 
us to face new security threats of the new century—a Europe that will 
avoid repeating the darkest moments of the 20th century and fulfill the 
brilliant possibilities of the 21st.                
                 President Clinton, 31 May 199710 
The NATO was established in 1949, after a number of Western European states, 
the United States, and Canada concluded the North Atlantic Treaty and formally set up 
post-World War II trans-Atlantic security arrangements.11 The preamble to the North 
Atlantic Treaty states that “The Parties to this Treaty reaffirm their faith in the purposes 
                                                 
10The Enlargement of NATO:  Why Adding Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic to NATO 
Strengthens American National Security (Washington:  United States Department of State, 1998); 
http://www.state.gov/www/regions/eur/nato2.pdf (accessed 11 June 2008).  
11James W. Morrison, ed.,  NATO Expansion and Alternative Future Security Alignments (Washington 
DC:  Institute for National Strategic Studies, 1995), 2; http://stinet.dtic.mil/cgi-
bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA304514&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf (accessed 25 April 2008).  
 10
and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and their desire to live in peace with 
all peoples and all governments.” In order to achieve this goal, the preamble continues, 
“They are determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilization of 
their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of 
law.  They seek to promote stability and well-being in the North Atlantic area. They are 
resolved to unite their efforts for collective defense and for the preservation of peace and 
security.”12  
The basis for NATO enlargement, which is a continuous, dynamic process 
without deadlines and milestones for completion, is Article 10 of the North Atlantic 
Treaty, which is also known as the Washington Treaty.13  According to this article, “The 
Parties may, by unanimous agreement, invite any other European State in a position to 
further the principles of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic 
area to accede to this Treaty.”14 From the beginning, NATO’s founding members 
envisioned the possibility of the Alliance’s transformation and set forth enlargement as 
one of the solutions for countries interested in joining the alliance in order to enhance 
their own security.  
Since the creation of the Alliance by the initial 12 founding nations NATO has 
grown to 26 members.  The accession of Greece and Turkey to the Alliance in 1952 
marked the first round of enlargement.  In 1955, the Federal Republic of Germany 
became NATO’s 15th member, and Spain became the Alliance’s 16th member in 1982. 
Since the reunification of Germany in 1990, the whole of Germany, including the 
territory of the former German Democratic Republic, has been part of NATO.  On 12 
March 1999, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland became the first former members 
of the Warsaw Pact to join NATO. Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, 
Slovakia and Slovenia joined NATO on 29 March 2004.15  After NATO invited Albania 
                                                 
12 NATO Official Text: The North Atlantic Treaty (Brussels:  NATO, 1949); 
http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/treaty.htm (accessed 25 April 2008).  
13NATO Topics:  Enlargement - How Did this Policy Evolve? (Brussels:  NATO, 2008); 
http://www.nato.int/issues/enlargement/evolution.html (accessed 9 July 2008).  
14NATO Official Text:  The North Atlantic Treaty  
15 NATO Topics:  Enlargement - How Did this Policy Evolve?  
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and Croatia to begin accession talks at the Bucharest Summit in April 2008, the Allies 
signed the Accession Protocols with Albania and Croatia on 9 July 2008, thereby opening 
the way for the full NATO membership of these two countries.16 Allied leaders also 
invited the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia17 to begin the accession process as 
soon as Macedonia and Greece had reached an agreement to resolve the issue of the 
country’s name.18 Thomas S. Szayna has suggested dividing the enlargement process into 
five stages: 
1. Development of military cooperation with the given country under the 
auspices of Partnership for Peace (PfP). 
2. A step-up in PfP cooperation that may include an implicit or explicit 
formulation of aspiration to membership by the given country and actions 
within PfP to advance that goal. 
3. Consensus-building within NATO regarding the given country’s 
eligibility for consideration for membership, crowned with NATO’s open 
recognition of the aspiration. 
4. Detailed scrutiny of the pros and cons of the country’s potential 
accession and discussion of the country’s shortcomings in meeting 
membership pre-conditions. 
5. Intra-alliance bargaining as to when the country will be invited to join.19 
Stage 1 is the easiest step as the PfP state and NATO begin to implement the 
commitment to enhance their cooperation.  Stage 2 represents an additional step forward 
in cooperation in which states directly and actively involved in PfP activities 
simultaneously take actions with a view to NATO membership.  How long a state will 
take to pass through these two stages depends mainly on the state, while stage 3 depends 
upon an assessment by NATO members of the country’s aspirations for membership.  If 
these aspirations are assessed by NATO members as realistic, the country proceeds to the 
next phase.  In stage 4, NATO members analyze the country’s qualifications and 
                                                 
16NATO Events:  NATO Allies Sign Accession Protocols for Albania and Croatia (Brussels:  NATO, 
2008); http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/2008/0807-sign-alb-croatia/0807-sign-alb-croatia.htm (accessed 14 July 
2008).  
17Turkey recognizes the Republic of Macedonia with its constitutional name. 
18NATO Topics: Enlargement - How Did this Policy Evolve?  
19Thomas S. Szayna, NATO Enlargement, 2000-2015:  Determinants and Implications for Defense 
Planning and Shaping (Santa Monica:  RAND, 2001), 44.  
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shortcomings according to the criteria listed in the Study on NATO Enlargement.  Once 
NATO members achieve consensus and recognize the minimum criteria for NATO 
membership of the aspirant country, stage 5 commences.  Stages 4 and 5 mainly depend 
on political decisions and require the aspiring country to build the necessary political 
support for NATO membership.  In stage 5, the Parliaments of the extant members and 
the aspiring new members must ratify the protocols for accession to the North Atlantic 
Treaty. During this time, the aspirant country tends to be treated as a member.20  
After the end of the Cold War, NATO as a political and military 
intergovernmental organization attempted to build a new security framework that would 
increase stability and security for all countries in the Euro-Atlantic region without 
creating new dividing lines.  NATO is viewed as one of the cornerstones of a safe and 
secure environment in Europe. The Alliance perceives security as a broad concept 
embracing political, economic, and defense components.  NATO views itself as a purely 
defensive Alliance whose basic missions are to provide collective defense for its 
members and to preserve peace in the Euro-Atlantic area.21 As Rebecca R. Moore noted, 
“Indeed, the mission of Europe whole and free reflected an evolving concept of security 
underpinned by a considerable faith in the pacifying effect of shared democratic 
institutions and values.”22 In 1997 NATO’s former Supreme Allied Commander Europe, 
George A. Joulwan, explained, “NATO is now more than ever a political alliance, but as 
a military man that suits me fine. We represent shared ideals, not just tanks and soldiers.  
We want our values to take root in other countries because that is the best way we know 
to prevent conflicts from exploding into war.”23 Bosnia and Herzegovina was the first 
battlefield for practicing this kind of mission. In other words, NATO reshaped its identity 
and built its new strategy in Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
                                                 
20 Szayna, NATO Enlargement, 2000-2015: Determinants and Implications for Defense Planning and 
Shaping,  45-48. 
21NATO Basic Texts: Study on NATO Enlargement (Brussels: North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 
September 1995), http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/enl-9501.htm (accessed 19 April 2008).  
22 Rebecca R. Moore, NATO's New Mission:  Projecting Stability in a Post-Cold War World 
(Westport:  Praeger Security International, 2007), 2.  
23 NATO's former Supreme Allied Commander Europe George A. Joulwan as quoted in Ibid., 2.   
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In order to promote positive political change in the new world order after the Cold 
War ended, Thomas S. Szayna concluded, “NATO’s current strategy resembles the 
proverbial carrot and stick.  NATO’s enlargement offers the inducement of membership 
(the carrot) as a way to encourage peaceful transformation and integration into a larger 
European security community.  NATO’s transformation, into a conflict prevention and 
management organization, provides the coercive component (the stick) that can be used 
to enforce peace and deter aggression in and around Europe.”24 All aspirants for NATO 
membership serve as examples of the application of the approach presented in the “carrot 
and stick” strategy.  
C. EURO ATLANTIC PARTNERSHIP COUNCIL  
In order to provide a framework for efficient cooperation with both the countries 
that had been members of the Warsaw Pact and with the new states born after the 
dissolution of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), NATO created the North 
Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) in 1991.25  The institutional framework of the 
NACC was NATO’s first attempt to go beyond purely military and diplomatic contacts 
with the states of the former Warsaw Pact and the former USSR and to develop 
mechanisms whose main purpose would be to strengthen relationships of consultation 
and cooperation with these countries on key political and security issues.26  This was the 
first step toward broad cooperation with former adversaries, which also included the 
establishment of four new institutions:  Partnership for Peace (PfP); the NATO-Russia 
Permanent Joint Council; the NATO-Ukraine Commission; and the Euro-Atlantic 
Partnership Council (EAPC).  
                                                 
24Szayna, NATO Enlargement, 2000-2015: Determinants and Implications for Defense Planning and 
Shaping, 9-10.  
25Robert F. Simmons, "Ten Years of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council: A personal reflection," 
NATO Review, Summer 2007, available at; http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2007/issue2/english/art5.html 
(accessed 11 July 2008).  
26Yost, NATO Transformed:  The Alliance's New Roles in International Security, 94.  
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The NACC was replaced by the EAPC in May 1997.27 The EAPC was NATO’s 
attempt to create a more efficient council that would offer a more operational partnership 
than the NACC.28 For non-NATO countries that do not want to be NATO members but 
do wish to contribute to Euro-Atlantic security, the EAPC provides a unique political 
framework to achieve this goal while maintaining their own distinct foreign and security 
policies. By enhancing political dialogue and practical cooperation between Allies and 
Partners, the EAPC provides an important contribution toward a common Euro-Atlantic 
security environment.  With 26 Allies and 23 Partners as members, the EAPC represents 
a forum of 49 states.29 “The EAPC’s founders, the NACC members and PfP Partners, 
declared that its establishment would be ‘a qualitative step forward in rising to a new 
level the dynamic and multifaceted political and military cooperation’ already achieved 
in NACC and PfP, and that it would ‘make a strong contribution to cooperative 
approaches to security and form an enduring part of the European security 
architecture.’”30 
D. PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE  
In order to enhance stability and security throughout Europe, NATO introduced 
Partnership for Peace (PfP) at the January 1994 Brussels Summit Meeting of the North 
Atlantic Council.31  Article 2 of the Partnership for Peace Framework Document states 
that, “This Partnership is established as an expression of a joint conviction that stability 
and security in the Euro-Atlantic area can be achieved only through cooperation and 
common action.”  According to the PfP Framework Document, “Protection and 
promotion of fundamental freedoms and human rights, and safeguarding of freedom, 
justice, and peace through democracy are shared values fundamental to the Partnership.” 
                                                 
27NATO Handbook:  PfP - Aim and Scope (Brussels: NATO, 2002); 
http://www.nato.int/docu/handbook/2001/hb030201.htm (accessed 11 July 2008).  
28NATO Topics: The Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (Brussels:  NATO, 2008); 
http://www.nato.int/issues/eapc/index.html (accessed 11July 2008).  
29Simmons, NATO Review:  Ten Years of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council  
30Yost, NATO Transformed: The Alliance's New Roles in International Security, 159.  
31NATO Handbook: PfP - Aim and Scope.  
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In addition to endorsing these basic principles, “States subscribing to this Document 
recall that they are committed to the preservation of democratic societies, their freedom 
from coercion and intimidation, and the maintenance of the principles of international 
law.”32 These principles have established a solid foundation for PfP members to actively 
participate in this partnership and proactively build a better political and security 
framework.    
The EAPC provides the overall framework for cooperation among NATO and 
Partner countries.  Nevertheless, the PfP has its own separate structural framework within 
the EAPC and maintains its own procedures.  Cooperation between NATO and each one 
of the PfP countries is institutionalized primarily through a bilateral relationship.33   
As a significant part of this relationship, the planning and review process (PARP) 
was established and “designed to provide a basis for identifying and evaluating forces 
and capabilities which might be made available for multinational training, exercises and 
operations in conjunction with Alliance forces.”34 The PARP is a process in which 
countries willing to participate are encouraged to voluntarily provide information about 
their ongoing reforms related to defense matters. “The information is provided in 
response to a ‘Survey of Overall PfP Interoperability’ issued by NATO in the autumn 
every second year.  Participating countries also provide an extensive overview of their 
armed forces and detailed information of the forces which they are prepared to make 
available for PfP cooperation.”35 After each participant country provides the required 
information, NATO prepares a Planning and Review Assessment with defined 




                                                 
32North Atlantic Council communiqué,  Partnership for Peace: Framework Document, (Brussels,: 
NATO, January 1994); http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c940110b.htm (accessed 18 May 2008).  
33 NATO Handbook: PfP - Aim and Scope.  
34 NATO Handbook:  The Partnership for Peace Planning and Review Process (PARP) (Brussels: 
NATO, 2002); http://www.nato.int/docu/handbook/2001/hb030208.htm (accessed 11 July 2008).  
35 Ibid. 
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combined operations with the NATO allies.  Ultimately, the Planning and Review 
Assessment and the Interoperability Objectives have to be jointly approved by the 
Alliance and the Partner country concerned.36   
PARP provides considerable incentives in preparing prospective members of 
NATO for accession.  Many nations which succeeded in overcoming all the obstacles on 
their way to NATO membership used PARP as a means to build modern, effective, 
compatible, mobile, professional, well-equipped, and democratically responsible armed 
forces.  Introduced at the November 2002 Prague Summit, PARP was designed to 
provide “new practical mechanisms, such as Individual Partnership Action Plans, which 
will ensure a comprehensive, tailored and differentiated approach to the Partnership, and 
which allow for support to the reform efforts of Partners.”37 At the June 2004 Istanbul 
Summit, NATO invited Partner countries to agree with the Alliance on Individual 
Partnership Action Plans (IPAPs) which “include political and economic reform goals; 
carry over and expand PARP objectives in defense reform; set goals for cooperation in 
other areas, such as Civil Emergency Planning and Science; and, perhaps most 
importantly, suggest to Partner countries to set up an interagency process to manage these 
goals collectively.”38  IPAPs promote active political dialogue between the Partners and 
NATO in order to discuss security and other issues.39  IPAPs are developed on a two-year 
basis, and NATO usually provides country-focused assistance and advice on issues. 
These consultations may constitute a key part of an IPAP process with a particular 
Partner country.40  The IPAP is designed for Partner countries that are not ready for 
participation in the Membership Action Plan yet but that have expressed a willingness to 
cooperate closely with NATO.41 
                                                 
36 NATO Handbook: The Partnership for Peace Planning and Review Process (PARP). 
37 "Prague Summit Declaration," 21 November 2002, paragraph 10, NATO Press Release (2002) 
127;http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2002/p02-127e.htm (accessed 18 May 2008).  
38 Simmons, "Ten Years of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council: A personal reflection," 38.  
39 Ibid., 38. 
40 Report on the Comprehensive Review of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council and Partnership for 
Peace (Brussels:  NATO, (2002); http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/b021121a.htm (accessed 11 July 2008).  
41 Moore, NATO's New Mission: Projecting Stability in a Post-Cold War World, 61.  
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E. MEMBERSHIP ACTION PLAN  
The Membership Action Plan (MAP) was launched in 1999 in response to lessons 
learned from the accession of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic to the Alliance. 
MAP is the assessment process structured to prepare aspiring nations for NATO 
membership.42 According to Jeffrey Simon of the U.S. National Defense University, 
MAP has four essential components:   
• a tailored Annual National Plan (ANP) that identifies key targets 
spanning the political/economic, defense/military, resources, 
security, and legal dimensions (dubbed “chapters” in MAP 
parlance) of Alliance membership 
• a feedback mechanism by which NAC members and the partner 
can jointly assess progress  
• a clearinghouse for coordinating security assistance from NATO 
members to the partner 
• enhanced defense planning at the country level that establishes and 
reviews agreed planning targets.43   
Within the MAP process, meetings of the North Atlantic Council (NAC) take 
place regularly with each aspirant country in order to discuss problems and develop 
mutually approved plans.  During these meetings, NATO civilian and military experts are 
available to discuss with representatives of the aspirant country all the issues related to 
attaining NATO membership.44  Since its inception, the MAP process has positively 
influenced the growth of interministerial coordination within MAP countries and 
enhanced international cooperation among these countries.  At the same time assisting 
aspirant countries to mobilize their respective societies towards reform and NATO 
membership, the “MAP [process] has become an increasingly important tool for member 
governments to build public support for NATO as well as parliamentary support for 
                                                 
42 Moore, NATO’s New Mission: Projecting Stability in a Post-Cold War World,  60-61. 
43 Simon, Roadmap to NATO Accession: Preparing for Membership, 2.  
44NATO Topics:  Membership Action Plan (MAP) (Brussels:  NATO, 1999); 
http://www.nato.int/issues/map/index.html (accessed 12 July 2008).  
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necessary resources.”45 By assisting MAP countries in formalizing and implementing 
internal reforms, the MAP process has made significant contributions to the NATO 
enlargement process by ensuring that new NATO members are capable of contributing to 
the alliance’s collective defense and peace support operations. As Moore observes, 
“According to diplomatic representatives from those states invited to join the Alliance at 
Prague in late 2002, … MAP served to shape internal political debates over both 
domestic and foreign policy by providing leverage for the reformist elements of their 
societies. One called it the ‘bible’ for NATO membership and observed that the process 
had served as a ‘mirror’ in front of his state’s reform efforts.”46  
Although many consider the MAP process a “bible” for NATO membership, the 
MAP process should not be considered a simple list of criteria for membership because 
“invitations to join the alliance will be based strictly on a consensus alliance decision that 
bringing the given state into the alliance will contribute to security in Europe.”47 
F. KEY ISSUES IN NATO ENLARGEMENT 
In order to answer the questions of “why” and “how” with regard to the NATO 
enlargement process, the Alliance published its Study on NATO Enlargement in 
September 1995.  The principles articulated in this study constituted the basis of NATO’s 
approach to inviting new members. However, some challenges still remain regarding this 
process which could have a significant impact on the NATO membership prospects of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina.  To assess the prospects of NATO membership for Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, analysts must first consider the fact that Bosnia and Herzegovina has 
coincidentally played a significant role in shaping the NATO transformation process and 
took part in the evolution of NATO’s new role.  The stakes in Bosnia for the future of the 
Alliance are immense due to the large investment of U.S. and Allied political capital and 
                                                 
45 Simon, Roadmap to NATO Accession:  Preparing for Membership, 1.  
46 Moore, NATO's New Mission:  Projecting Stability in a Post-Cold War World, 61.  
47 Thomas S. Szayna, The Future of NATO and Enlargement , Testimony for the Subcommittee on 
Europe of the Committee on International Relations, United States House of Representatives on April 17, 
2002, (Santa Monica:  RAND Corporation, April 2002), 2; 
http://www.rand.org/pubs/testimonies/2005/CT196.pdf (accessed 23 July 2008).  
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credibility to date.  It is worth mentioning again the words of Walter Slocombe, then U.S. 
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, who in 1996 commented: 
Just as the NATO-Russia relationship is being forged in Bosnia, so too is 
the future of NATO itself. It is in Bosnia where all sixteen members of 
NATO, each one making a contribution, are sending the message that 
NATO is the bedrock on which the future security and stability of Europe 
will be built. It is in Bosnia that we are demonstrating that NATO can 
meet new challenges.48 
Given Bosnia’s significant role in NATO transformation and enlargement since 
the early 1990s, and the high political-military stakes within Bosnia and across Europe, it 
is reasonable to conclude that Bosnia is also going to be a significant part of the future of 
the Alliance. The unsuccessful efforts of the United Nations (UN) and the European 
Union (EU) in conflict management in Bosnia in 1991-1995 have strongly influenced the 
Alliance to be supportive regarding the country’s membership aspiration.  The western 
Balkans constitute a fragile region which could explode into violence easily if the 
situation is not maintained under control. This happened in the early 1990s, and the 
international community was totally unprepared.  The NATO enlargement process 
supports the Alliance’s basic goal of enhancing security and extending stability 
throughout the Euro-Atlantic area. By embracing Bosnia and Herzegovina, NATO would 
send the message that stability and security in this country and in the whole Euro-Atlantic 
area will be enhanced and maintained under control. 
The NATO enlargement process has faced various questions and criticisms. 
“Some Western critics of NATO enlargement maintain that Russia’s anxieties about 
enlargement leading to a more powerful Alliance are misplaced, contending that the 
addition of new members will contribute to the erosion of the Alliance’s cohesion.”49 
Many specialists have argued that expansion could ruin NATO by:  1) causing a loss of 
focus and cohesion and undermining its ability to reach consensus, and 2) jeopardizing 
                                                 
48 Walter B. Slocombe, then Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, remarks to the Atlantic Council, 
14 June 1996, text furnished by the Department of Defense, p. 17, quoted in Yost, NATO Transformed:  
The Alliance's New Roles in International Security, 227.  
49 Yost, NATO Transformed, 117. 
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relations between allies in favor of and against expansion.50  The implications for NATO 
of adding new members depend greatly on “which states are admitted and how many 
states are admitted…smaller states would probably be less influential and more willing to 
join a consensus in NATO on most issues.”51  Bosnia and Herzegovina is not a big state, 
and this principle would be consistent with these circumstances.  Thus, the argument that 
the membership of Bosnia and Herzegovina would contribute to the erosion of the 
Alliance’s cohesion is not credible or persuasive.   
According to the Study on NATO Enlargement, “Enlargement should … 
strengthen the Alliance’s effectiveness and cohesion; and preserve the Alliance’s political 
and military capability to perform its core functions of common defense as well as to 
undertake peacekeeping and other new missions.”52  With regard to decisions about who 
will be invited to join NATO, “Ultimately, Allies will decide by consensus whether to 
invite each new member to join according to their judgment of whether doing so will 
contribute to security and stability in the North Atlantic area at the time such a decision is 
to be made.”53  Moreover, according to the Study on NATO Enlargement, “The ability of 
prospective members to contribute militarily to collective defense and to the Alliance’s 
new missions will be a factor in deciding whether to invite them to join the Alliance.”54 
Therefore, Bosnia and Herzegovina must take active measures and commit significant 
budgetary and political resources via participation in the PfP in order to gain strong 
credentials to achieve NATO membership.  The criteria for membership are getting more 
stringent as NATO becomes larger, and this is the main challenge to Bosnia and 
Herzegovina on its way to NATO membership.  In order to achieve this goal, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina must mobilize its society and national resources. 
                                                 
50 Morrison, NATO Expansion and Alternative Future Security Alignments, 40.  
51 Morrison, NATO Expansion and Alternative Future Security Alignments, 76. 
52 NATO Basic Texts:  Study on NATO Enlargement, paragraph 4.  
53 Ibid., paragraph 7. 
54 Ibid., paragraph 75. 
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Another one of the salient reservations expressed by critics of the NATO 
enlargement process is “the risk of an unnecessary confrontation with Russia.”55 Russia 
has always been against NATO enlargement. Moscow considers NATO enlargement a 
process contrary to Russia’s national interests. “Since NATO countries began serious 
consideration of enlargement, Russian political leaders across the political spectrum, 
from pro-Western democrats to centrists to Communists and extreme nationalists have 
been strongly opposed to NATO enlargement.”56 Interviews with NATO experts in June 
2008 suggest that Bosnia and Herzegovina’s membership in the Alliance would not 
challenge Russian's interests directly.  Bosnia and Herzegovina is neither a former 
Warsaw Pact country nor a country of strategic interest for Russia, in view of its size, 
military potential, and natural resources.  The situation of Bosnia and Herzegovina stands 
in contrast to Russian strategic opposition to NATO membership for former Soviet 
republics such as Ukraine and Georgia.  The risk of a confrontation with Russia could 
have only indirect implications for the pace of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s progress on its 
way to NATO.57 At the Bucharest Summit in April 2008, NATO members declared:   
NATO welcomes Ukraine’s and Georgia’s Euro-Atlantic aspirations for 
membership in NATO.  We agreed today that these countries will become 
members of NATO…MAP is the next step for Ukraine and Georgia on 
their direct way to membership.  Today we make clear that we support 
these countries’ applications for MAP.58  
Despite this huge support for NATO membership of these two countries, the main 
reason why these two countries are not yet included in the MAP process is the strategic 
opposition from Russia.  
According to Mir Shakil-ur-Rahman, a Pakistani commentator on international 
affairs, “Russia regards the missile defense system, coupled with NATO enlargement, as 
                                                 
55 Yost, NATO Transformed, 117. 
56 Steven Woehrel, NATO Enlargement and Russia (Washington:  CRS 97-477 F, 1998), 1; 
https://www.policyarchive.org/bitstream/handle/10207/394/97-477_19980414.pdf?sequence=1 (accessed 27 July 
2008).  
57 Author's interviews with NATO experts in Brussels in June 2008. 
58 Bucharest Summit Declaration, 3 April 2008, paragraph 23, NATO Press Release (2008)049; 
http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2008/p08-049e.html (accessed 18 May 2008).  
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an aggressive drive by the United States to take control of Moscow’s strategic 
backyard.”59  The best example of disagreements within the Alliance over the accession 
of these countries to MAP came after the invasion of Georgia by Russian troops on 8 
August 2008, when Russia launched large-scale air attacks across Georgia.  According to 
some observers, the reason for this invasion resides in NATO’s failure to offer Georgia a 
Membership Action Plan (MAP) at the April 2008 NATO summit, while according to 
others NATO’s insistence that Georgia eventually would become a member provoked 
Russian aggression.60  The North Atlantic Council (NAC) met in a special foreign 
ministerial session on 19 August 2008 and re-affirmed the Alliance’s support for 
Georgia.  In order to oversee the NATO-Georgia relationship, as a consultation 
mechanism the NAC decided to develop, in cooperation with Georgia, a NATO-Georgia 
Commission.  With regard to relations with Russia, NATO Secretary General Jaap de 
Hoop Scheffer underlined: “We are not closing doors,” but “we…cannot continue with 
business as usual…as long as Russia does not commit to the principles upon which we 
agreed to base our relationship.”61  
If Ukraine and Georgia are not accepted in the MAP process in the near future, 
the same situation will probably also apply to Bosnia and Herzegovina.  NATO members 
who presently give support to Ukraine and Georgia probably would not be so supportive 
of Bosnia and Herzegovina for the same reason − that is, to demonstrate their backing for 
Kyiv and Tbilisi in the face of Russian pressure.  As a result, the tempo of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina in approaching NATO membership could be indirectly slowed down, and 
Bosnia and Herzegovina might be on the waiting list in line behind Ukraine and 
Georgia.62 
                                                 
59 Mir Shakil-ur-Rahman, "Russia Warns Georgia Against NATO Bid," INTERNATIONAL the News, 
July 11, 2008; http://www.thenews.com.pk/daily_detail.asp?id=123524 (accessed 27 July 2008).  
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(Washington: Congressional Research Service, 2008).  
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The implications of the NATO enlargement process for the cohesiveness of the 
Alliance and the potential risk of confrontation with Russia should not have a big impact 
on Bosnia and Herzegovina’s journey towards NATO membership.  The main challenge 
for Bosnia and Herzegovina remains within the country itself. 
G. CONCLUSION 
After the end of the Cold War, NATO recognized the opportunity to transform 
itself to build a new security structure to address emerging threats.  Facing new threats in 
the post-Cold War environment and being aware of the new roles that the NATO alliance 
has to undertake in order to achieve its goals, the Allies have established institutions such 
as Partnership for Peace, the NATO-Russia Council, the NATO-Ukraine Commission, 
and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council.  In addition, the NATO enlargement process 
has played a significant role in enhancing the existing structure of security in the Euro-
Atlantic region. NATO enlargement has threatened no nation, and it has contributed to 
developing a broad European security architecture based on real cooperation throughout 
the whole of Europe, thereby enhancing stability and security for all.  NATO has been 
deeply involved in the recent history of Bosnia and Herzegovina and remains strongly 
committed to supporting Bosnia and Herzegovina in its aspirations and progress toward 
NATO membership.  
Any country aspiring to NATO membership needs to fulfill two steps: active 
participation in the PfP program and the MAP.  The primary purpose of these two steps is 
to enhance the readiness of the aspirant country for the responsibilities of NATO 
membership, even though poor participation in PfP or the MAP process does not 
necessarily preclude any decision by the Alliance on future membership.  However, the 
NATO enlargement process has created some challenges to the Alliance regarding the 
prospects of aspiring countries. The cohesiveness of the Alliance is one of the most 
prominent challenges that will become more pressing as the Alliance becomes larger.  In 
order to maintain and strengthen its cohesiveness, NATO has to firmly enforce accepted 
criteria for the accession of new members.  For Bosnia and Herzegovina, this means the 
thorough implementation of PfP programs.  The mobilization of the country's entire 
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society is necessary to meet these criteria, unless NATO decides to give priority to the 
idea that integration within the Alliance is a condition of stabilization, rather than the 
other way around, based upon the political and strategic circumstances.  In that case, 
NATO could invite Bosnia and Herzegovina to join the Alliance before the full 
satisfaction of the membership criteria.   
One of the salient concerns in the NATO enlargement process is the risk of a 
confrontation with Russia.  In the context of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s bid for NATO 
membership, this risk is considered manageable. However, the tempo of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina’s journey toward NATO membership could be indirectly slowed down if 
NATO continues to postpone decisions on inviting Ukraine and Georgia to participate in 
the MAP process. 
Despite these broad strategic and political factors, Bosnia and Herzegovina fits 
well in the NATO enlargement process. There is a consensus among NATO members 
that Bosnia and Herzegovina will be welcome to join NATO as soon as it completes all 
the necessary reforms and meets its obligations. 
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III. CROATIA – CASE STUDY 
A. THE WAY TO NATO MEMBERSHIP  
The countries that join us can be rightly proud of what they have achieved 
in meeting NATO's demanding criteria for membership. The many years 
of hard work within the Membership Action Plan have paid off. Due to 
your hard work, Allies can be confident that your admission to the 
Alliance will strengthen NATO. 
NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer 63 
3 April 2008 
 
With these words the NATO Secretary General finally announced that Allied 
leaders had agreed to invite Albania and Croatia to begin accession talks with NATO.  In 
this meeting Allies once again “reaffirmed their commitment to keeping NATO’s door 
open to any European democracy willing and able to assume the responsibilities and 
obligations of membership, in accordance with Article 10 of the Washington Treaty.”64  
The Republic of Croatia, part of the Euro-Atlantic community, has recognized 
NATO membership as one of the most important aims of its foreign policy.  Being aware 
of global political, economic and security challenges, Croatia wants to actively 
participate in the creation of a global European security policy through a Euro-Atlantic 
framework; and only NATO membership can provide security and help assure the 
territorial integrity of Croatia.  In order to achieve this goal, Croatia has undertaken many 
economic, political, legislative, and defense reforms.  “In May 2006, American Vice 
President Richard [Dick] Cheney heightened the political dynamics of this issue when he 
indicated that he was ‘tremendously impressed’ with Croatia’s foreign policy choices and 
suggested that Croatia was making especially good progress toward membership in 
NATO.”65 
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Croatia started the intensification of diplomatic efforts toward Euro-Atlantic 
integration in the 1990s, after the “Homeland War” ended.  In 1996 Croatia officially 
defined membership in NATO and the EU as two supremely important aims for Croatia’s 
foreign policy.  Because of the nature of Franjo Tudjman's authoritarian regime in 1990s, 
Croatia had not been taken seriously as a potential partner until Tudjman’s death in 1999. 
Entering the PfP program was the first step toward Euro-Atlantic integration.  On 25 May 
2000, Minister for Foreign Affairs Tonino Picula of Croatia signed the PfP Framework 
Document, and Croatia became a member of PfP program and EAPC. With this step, 
Croatia assumed the obligation to implement policies that include preserving democracy, 
respecting the UN Charter, resolving all disputes by peaceful means, respecting the 
integrity of international borders, and complying with all agreements regarding non-
proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD).  Croatia gave NATO its first 
Survey of Overall PfP Interoperability in October 2000 and immediately began 
participating in the PARP process.  Croatia submitted its Individual Partnership Program 
(IPP) for 2001 and its Presentation Document to NATO at the end of 2000.  In order to 
enhance coordination and cooperation with NATO, on 13 February 2001 Croatia 
established its Mission to NATO in Brussels, Belgium.  In June 2001 a PfP Status of 
Forces Agreement (SOFA) was signed between Croatia and NATO.66  
Within the IPP, Croatia has initiated various PfP program activities that have 
provided a better understanding of the overall PfP process and enabled Croatia to 
strengthen its own status as a reliable partner.  Through the IPP Croatia has specified 
areas for cooperation with NATO and has gradually undertaken increasingly more 
activities which have been revised annually.  These activities have been implemented 
through seminars, courses, conferences and military exercises.  Recently, many activities 
in the IPP were focused on the preparation of units designated for NATO-led Peace 
Support Operations. Additionally, through participation within PARP, Croatia has 
gradually improved the interoperability of its defense system with NATO. Croatia has 
defined its own Partnership Goals, which in priority have usually been related to the units 
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that Croatia intended to assign to NATO PfP operations.  PARP is one of the most 
important tools in the PfP program, providing transparency in defense planning to both 
sides, Croatia and NATO.67  
In 2001 Croatia was offered an Intensified Dialogue (ID) with NATO, as a 
substitute tool for those aspirant countries that have not yet been invited to MAP status. 
This dialogue has been implemented in the form of intensified consultation between 
parties in the NAC and national representatives at the head of state and ministerial level, 
in order to clarify the most important types of activities crucial for enhanced cooperation 
in the political, military, financial and security fields.  ID has served as a temporary 
framework on the way to MAP.68   
On 15 May 2002, in Reykjavik, Croatia was invited to join the MAP.  It was once 
again a reaffirmation of NATO’s “open door policy.” Though participation in the MAP 
does not guarantee accession to NATO membership, this was an important step forward 
for Croatia in order to implement all the reforms necessary for NATO membership.  
Taking advantage of this plan, Croatia succeeded in undertaking many reforms; and 
through its Annual National Plan (ANP) Croatia has defined all the necessary steps to be 
taken.  MAP includes not only defense and military issues, but also political, economic, 
security, resource and legislative concerns.  The MAP plan therefore helped Croatia to 
consolidate not only the efforts of the Ministry of Defense, but those of all of Croatian 
society towards the common aim of NATO membership.69  The possibility of gaining EU 
and NATO membership was the driving force in motivating Croatian society to initiate 
and implement the many reforms needed to accomplish the mission.  “Without the option 
of NATO and EU membership and the potential benefits they may bring, the Croatian 
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government would have not initiated the defense reform process at this pace.”70  Not 
surprisingly, the policy of “stick and carrot” was applied in Croatia as in all other 
countries seeking NATO membership in last two decades.  
On 3 April 2008, the NATO Allies decided to invite Croatia and Albania to begin 
accession talks to join the Alliance.  NATO heads of state and government congratulated 
Croatia and Albania “on this historic achievement, earned through years of hard work and 
a demonstrated commitment to our common security and NATO’s shared values.”71  In 
addition, NATO declared, “The accession of these new members will strengthen security 
for all in the Euro-Atlantic area, and bring us closer to our goal of a Europe that is whole, 
free, and at peace.”72 On 9 July 2008 the Accession Protocols with Albania and Croatia 
were signed by NATO allies. Ratification of these two protocols by the current NATO 
allies will bring about the full NATO membership of these two countries.73 
B. DEFENSE REFORM 
NATO is the main promoter of defense reform in the Euro-Atlantic area, mainly 
through its PfP and MAP mechanisms.  Defense reform was a huge challenge for Croatia 
because it was a test of its ability to adopt and implement the standards and procedures of 
NATO.  NATO’s complex defense reform program involves the improvement of civil- 
military relations, military reform in order to make the armed forces compatible and 
interoperable with the NATO structure and standards, and modernization of the armed 
forces in order to cope with new global threats and contribute to NATO-led crisis 
response operations.74 This study’s analysis of defense reform in Croatia includes  
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achievements in civil-military relations and military reform.  It also examines the 
modernization plans of the Croatian Armed Forces (CAF) and their ability to contribute 
to peacekeeping missions. 
1.  Achievements  
a.  Civil-Military Relations 
One of the most important preconditions for successful defense reform is 
civilian and democratic oversight of the armed forces in order to provide strong political 
support and to ensure the allocation of sufficient resources. At the same time, the 
preparation and critical analysis of strategic papers presents a foundation for any kind of 
reform.   The importance of civil-military relations has been underlined in the Study on 
NATO Enlargement, which concludes that “enlargement will contribute to enhanced 
stability and security for all countries in the Euro-Atlantic area by encouraging and 
supporting democratic reforms, including civilian and democratic control over the 
military.”75  
Civil-military relations in Croatia were stagnant in the 1990s because of 
Croatia's unique history.   Croatia was formerly a communist-ruled country with an 
inherited legacy of “Homeland War” and troubled civil-military relations under Franjo 
Tudjman.  During the “Homeland War” the Army was considered a protector of the state 
and there was no clear line between the government and the military. “The country has 
been characterized as a ‘totalitarian dictatorship’ during these years, with Tudjman at the 
helm.”76 After the “Homeland War” (1991-1995) the Army was politicized by Tudjman 
and mainly used as a tool to control the state.  Until Tudjman’s death in 1999 Croatia 
could not improve its civil-military relations and could not enhance cooperation with 
NATO.   
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After Tudjman died and his ruling party lost elections, a new era of 
democratization began in Croatia.  “Its parliamentary representation crashed from 59 
percent of seats to just 29 percent in January and February 2000 elections.”77 The 
democratically elected president, Stipe Mesić, and the government of the new Prime 
Minister, Ivica Račan, expressed their willingness to interact with and eventually join the 
European Union and NATO.  Relating to democratic control over the Armed Forces, 
Ivica Račan observed in 2000: 
Establishing democratic control over the armed forces and defense 
reforms are mutually reinforcing efforts and therefore need to be tackled 
together. New legislation is being prepared to expand parliament’s 
oversight of the military, a corps of civilian defense experts is being 
created, and defense standards and procedures designed to increase 
transparency are being introduced.78 
Indeed a newly elected government opened a new page in Croatia’s 
history. More democracy and enhanced transparency in every segment of Croatian 
society have helped Croatia to undertake essential steps toward a better future while still 
dealing with many legacies remaining from the former regime and other episodes in 
Croatian history.    
b. Military Reform 
As a consequence of the many political games of numerous parties, 
military reform in Croatia between 2000 and 2003 did not make any improvement in 
restructuring and modernizing the CAF. Under external pressure within the PfP program, 
in 2002 the Croatian parliament accepted the first National Security Strategy and Defense 
Strategy for Croatia.  Without adoption of these strategic documents, admission of 
Croatia to MAP in 2002 would have not been possible.  In 2005 Croatia took the first 
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serious step forward relating to military reform, completing and adopting the Strategic 
Defense Review (SDR).79  In the preface to the SDR President Stjepan Mesić stated that,   
The security changes and risks that marked the beginning of the 21st 
Century have introduced a new set of rules for all of us. Therefore, it is 
necessary for us to change and adapt our defense capabilities, as well as 
the way we think and behave in order to meet the new requirements.  Fully 
committed to promoting peace and security, we will develop a defense 
system and Armed Forces that meet modern requirements and are based 
on the realistic capacities at our disposal. This very document perhaps best 
demonstrates the course Croatia will embark on in contributing to 
developing good neighborly relations, peace and stability in the region.80 
The course Croatia would embark on was to undertake comprehensive 
reforms that would enable it to meet new challenges.  In the same document Minister of 
Defense Berislav Rončević noted that, 
In order to achieve a full operational capability of the defense system, it is 
necessary to begin training and equipping our units for the entire spectrum 
of operations. We will be able to achieve this through a modern and 
flexibly organized defense system that will primarily be founded on well-
trained, equipped and mobile armed force.81 
Assessment of the security environment in the region suggests that a 
direct, conventional threat to Croatia is not likely, although it cannot be completely 
excluded.  In view of the possible need to deal more with asymmetric and transnational 
threats, and having to cope with complex security issues, the SDR suggests a new type of 
military structure with a military doctrine and standards compatible with those of NATO 
and the development of corresponding capabilities based on existing and future threats.  
The risk and threat assessments along with the growth of international obligations have 
directly influenced how future CAF missions and tasks will be defined.  Croatia has 
recognized collective security as the most beneficial strategy, particularly with regard to 
the economy.  Croatia has to ensure that sufficient resources are allocated to defense by 
                                                 
79 Pietz, Defense Reform and Conversion in Albania, Macedonia and Croatia, 36.   
80 Republic of Croatia, Ministry of Defense, Strategic Defense Review (Zagreb, Croatia: Ministry of 
Defense, 2005), http://www.morh.hr/katalog/documents/SPO_eng.pdf (accessed 30 June 2008).   
81 Ibid. 
 32
planning well-balanced budgets that provide defense expenditures sufficient for fulfilling 
the role of the CAF.  According to the SDR, “The role of the CAF is to provide for 
national defense, support Croatia's foreign and security policy, and assist civil authorities 
in emergency and crisis situations.”82 The Croatian Constitution, Defense Law and the 
Armed Forces Service Law define the organization and command of the CAF.   
According to these laws, the President of the Republic of Croatia is the 
Supreme Commander of the CAF. “The CAF are organized into staffs, commands, units 
and organizations, and they consist of branches, services and specialties.  The branches 
are:  the Croatian Army, the Croatian Navy and the Croatian Air Force and Air 
Defense.”83 The new force structure has to be reorganized through the rationalization of 
numbers of command levels in order to provide effectiveness and an appropriate division 
of responsibilities within a single command and control system. The future size of the 
CAF is going to be reached by reducing the current force through a phased approach and 
gradual transformation to the new structure.84  As the Table 1 shows, on 31 December 
2007 Ministry of Defense (MoD) and CAF personnel totaled 22,650.  
 
Table 1.   The structure of personnel in the MoD and CAF on 31 December 2007 85   
(From: 85) 
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Croatia is a country in transition, with a military that was established in 
1991.  The CAF developed during the period 1991-95, when they fought for the 
independence and autonomous existence of a newly created state.  “These forces were 
rapidly formed from a combination of the old Yugoslav system, overseas experiences of 
numerous volunteers (such as those from the French Foreign Legion) and a slowly 
emerging indigenous system.”86 The CAF have been developed based on restricted 
offensive and territorially-based self-defense capabilities which could not conduct any 
large-scale offensive operations.  Croatia’s defense potential has been gradually 
weakening due to a lack of money, an inadequate personnel policy, and poorly 
maintained weapon systems and equipment.87  Greater human, material and financial 
resources are crucial prerequisites in order for the CAF to be functional.  
According to the SDR, the personnel structure of the CAF in 2005 was 
primarily the result of a poor personnel management system, the legacies of wartime, and 
the establishment of the CAF during war in the early 1990s. This document elaborates a 
series of shortfalls, which “include an ‘aging force’, where the average age of personnel 
is inadequate, a relatively excess number of management personnel, lack of qualified 
personnel and inadequate personnel placement.”88  The document emphasizes that the 
lack of a consistent Human Resource Management (HRM) policy is one of the main 
reasons for the current situation.  One of the most important prerequisites for success 
across the reform agenda is the quality of personnel.   
As Pietz noted in 2006, “the military education of CAF personnel is still 
very low… a lot of ‘uneducated heroes’ were promoted during the war to positions where 
they now face tensions with old JNA-educated officers and young officers who have 
undertaken advanced training at Western military academies.”89  Furthermore, various 
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educational programs have been started, but their success has been diminished by the 
selection criteria and the use made of graduates afterwards. In choosing people for study 
abroad, for instance, language skills have often been more important than qualifications 
for the course or the improvement of knowledge and skills in high demand. Upon 
returning from a course, officers have been put in positions having little or nothing to do 
with their newly-acquired abilities. The fact that there is no proper personnel planning 
and career system in place and the period needed for recruitment of new personnel and 
cadets mean that it will be a long time before the organization as a whole is up to the 
tasks facing the CAF.90 Proficiency is also hard to achieve with the unsatisfactory age 
structure within the armed forces and the “inverted personnel pyramid with too many 
chiefs and no Indians (and few coming in).”91 This is the reality that the CAF have to 
transform in order to achieve a more efficient and transparent HRM policy in order to 
professionalize and gradually renew personnel in the CAF able to meet new challenges.  
Modern weapon systems, military equipment and other technical means 
are crucial for executing missions in modern warfare.  Currently, limited amounts of 
weapons and military equipment are produced in Croatia.  Existing equipment is largely 
of Eastern European origin, including the former Yugoslavia, as well as some limited 
quantities from Western countries.  All of the equipment is old and incompatible with 
NATO standards.  The uncontrolled import of military equipment and weapons has 
resulted in a variety of different types and models of particular classes of weapons.  
Interoperability is important for a materiel management system because it requires the 
adoption and implementation of a series of NATO standardization agreements 
(STANAGs).92  For the CAF, increasing the level of interoperability is its highest 
priority.  In order to achieve this goal, membership in the NATO PfP program ─ and  
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especially in the MAP ─ is crucial.  The exchange of information and conduct of military 
exercises contribute to the improvement of the CAF’s capabilities and enables the CAF to 
perform their numerous roles.93 
Many military bases and infrastructure assets have to be maintained, 
regardless of whether those facilities are currently in use.  In order to solve this problem, 
Croatia has to define prospective and non-prospective locations.  Divesting the 
government of non-perspective locations would free critical human and financial 
resources which could be used for enhancing defense reform.94  
One of the NATO recommendations for admission into the Alliance is to 
have armed forces with a well-balanced budget structure.  The recommended allocation 
prescribes 50% of the budget for personnel expenses, 30% for operational costs, and 20% 
for equipment, modernization and related expenses.  A well balanced budget structure 
includes providing the financial framework for the CAF necessary for maintaining the 
capabilities required by NATO standards.  NATO standards require defense budget 
allocations around 2% of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP).   Currently in Croatia the 
portion of the state budget allocated to defense is 1.83% of GDP.95  For Croatia this 
poses a significant challenge along with the other reforms that must take place.  Related 
to this issue, as the SDR suggests, “the success of Croatia’s defense reform efforts 
directly depends on strong political support from the national leadership and its 
corresponding commitment to provide adequate resources.”96  
2. Plans for the Future  
In order to fulfill its missions, Croatia has to develop armed forces capable of 
meeting new threats with small, professional, and quickly deployable units.  Besides the 
obligation of the CAF to make contributions to the collective defense of the Alliance and 
to assist civilian institutions within the country, the ability to contribute to Allied crisis 
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response missions abroad is another key dimension that Croatia has to take into 
consideration.  According to the CAF Long-Term Development Plan (LTDP), these 
capabilities have to be developed through advances in human resources, material 
resources, the logistical system, doctrine and training, international military cooperation, 
and research and development.  The CAF LTDP is a document which provides the 
framework for gradual implementation of defense reform in the period 2006-2015.  The 
objective of this plan is to determine the financial framework and military capabilities 
that are going to be developed and maintained within that framework.  The course of this 
development has been proposed in the SDR through defining the vision of the CAF as 
follows: 
• A CAF numerical size that will not exceed 16 000 active military 
personnel, 2 000 soldier-trainees (overall annual contingent) and 
up to 6 000 contract reserve members; 
• The CAF will be manned exclusively with a volunteer contingent 
by 2010; 
• Abandonment of the present territorial principle of force 
organization; 
• The CAF service commands will have a primary role in the 
preparation of forces, while the CAF General Staff will be 
responsible for the conduct of  operations;  
• A separately organized joint command will provide support in the 
segment of logistics, health care and personnel; 
• The land forces will be the incumbent of CAF joint operations 
conduct, by developing and maintaining balanced capabilities to 
respond to modern security challenges; 
• 8% of the active land component will be deployed or ready to be 
deployed to international military operations, while 40% will 
possess capabilities to participate in operations outside the 
territory of the Republic of Croatia; 
• Members of the contract reserve will prepare to participate in 
operations inside and outside Croatian territory; 
• Naval forces will develop capabilities for surveillance and 
protection of the maritime space of the Republic of Croatia, as 
well as support for the land forces in joint operations; 
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• The air forces will maintain capabilities for surveillance and 
protection of Croatian air space, as well as support for the land 
forces in joint operations; 
• CAF capabilities will be achieved and maintained through 
adequate training of units and CAF members, as well as through 
procurement of the necessary weaponry and equipment.97   
In order to realize this vision the next key challenges will be the most salient. 
The CAF have to achieve a fully professional personnel structure and contract 
reserve. In order to achieve this, the HRM policy has to be carefully implemented 
through four main HRM functions:  recruitment and selection, professional development, 
personnel support and separation process.98  Military education has to be fully supported  
by the civilian education system and complemented by military curricula.  This goal 
requires a common effort by military and civilian institutions together and time for its 
implementation. 
In order to meet the needs for new capabilities, the CAF have to allocate 
resources for the modernization and procurement of weaponry and military equipment. 
Each branch of service has established a series of defense procurement priorities.  In 
order to improve mobility, the Croatian Army concentrated on the procurement of 
wheeled armored vehicles.  To this end, a contract was signed in October 2007 between 
the MoD and Finland’s Patria Vehicles.  By 2015 the Army plans to have 126 new APCs 
(Armored Personnel Carriers).  Modernization of existing M-84A tanks is planned to 
occur from 2011-2015.99  In order to provide an effective air capability, the Croatian Air 
Force has to undertake efforts to procure a modern combat aircraft.  The Croatian MoD is 
planning to initiate the process of procurement of 12 new fighter aircraft by the end of 
2009, with an introduction into service planned by 2011.  The Croatian Air Force also 
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requires additional new basic training aircraft.  The acquisition of the turboprop Pilatus 
PC-9M Advanced Turbo Trainer in 1996 and the Jet Ranger III helicopter has 
significantly enhanced training.  So far only five Zlin Z 242 L training airplanes have 
been procured.  A contract for ten new Mi-171Sh helicopters has been signed  between 
the Croatian MoD and the Russian state-owned defense export agency Rosoboronexport 
as a part of an effort by Russia to reduce its debt to Croatia.  The Croatian Navy will be 
equipped with a new patrol ship which will ensure its capability to control territorial 
waters and protect the ecological fishing zone in the Adriatic Sea.100  All of these efforts 
in the modernization and procurement of weapons and equipment will enable the 
participation of the CAF in NATO-led operations as fully professional and highly mobile 
forces. 
Along with the modernization and procurement of weaponry and military 
equipment, the CAF has to reduce the number of military sites through a process called 
“conversion.” Conversion is the process of selling sites that are not considered of 
prospective utility for the CAF in the long term and modernizing the sites that the CAF 
plan to retain.  The military sites to be retained have to be modernized in order to 
improve the quality of life and working conditions of CAF units.  This process requires a 
structured and detailed approach in order to produce the requisite benefit.  This is a costly 
process because all abandoned military sites are potentially ecological hazards that have 
to be rehabilitated in a proper manner. 101 
In order to achieve all of the goals defined in the CAF LTDP, a stable supply of 
financial resources is necessary for defense needs at a recurring annual level of 2% of 
GDP. This is one of the main prerequisites for reliable financing, without which Croatia, 
as a member of NATO, will not be able to achieve and maintain the desired level of 
capabilities in its armed forces.  Table 2 shows the trend of changes in GDP, the State 
Budget and the Defense Budget from 2002 to 2008.  According to this table the 
proportion of spending on defense in the state budget and in GDP was lowest in 2007, 
and in 2008 has slightly increased, but is still less than the recommended 2% of GDP.  
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(In millions of Euros) 
 
Table 2.   Changes in GDP, State Budget and the Defense Budget 2002 – 2008.102 
(From: 102) 
 
C. FOREIGN POLICY 
1. Participation in Peacekeeping Missions  
One of NATO’s recommendations for admission into the Alliance is the 
participation of aspirant countries in peacekeeping operations in order to demonstrate a 
willingness and ability to share international security burdens.  “NATO Secretary General 
de Hoop Scheffer has repeatedly emphasized that NATO’s success in the peacekeeping 
and peace-enforcement operation in Afghanistan is the alliance’s number one 
priority.”103 Aware of the difficulties associated with developing capabilities for 
peacekeeping missions, NATO has encouraged candidate states to develop “niche 
capabilities” to assist NATO missions.104  Croatia's contribution in Afghanistan to date is 
200 troops in Mazar-e-Sharif and Faizabadan in northern Afghanistan.  According to the 
Annual Readiness Report of the Croatian Defense System for 2007, the number of 
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personnel in Afghanistan is planned to increase to 300 in 2008.  Croatia also leads 
Operational Mentoring and Liaison Teams (OMLT) that train Afghan forces and 
participate in a military medical team with Albania and the Former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia.  According to some independent assessments, it is not clear if Croatia has 
committed the financial resources necessary to carry out all the obligations planned for 
the future.105  Due to a lack of logistical capabilities, Croatia will likely continue to need 
support from its allies in order to continue to participate in international missions. 
In terms of cooperating with the UN, on 28 March 2008, the Croatian Parliament 
decided that CAF units would participate in the United Nations Disengagement Observer 
Force (UNDOF) peace support mission in the Golan Heights.  Up to 100 CAF members 
will replace Slovak soldiers within the Austrian-led battalion in order to control the 
separation zone between Israel and Syria.  In total, Croatia has deployed 46 CAF 
members to 13 UN peace support operations.106  Table 3 shows the CAF contributions to 
the UN operations. Overall, the CAF’s efforts in the missions outside of Croatia have 
generated applause from the U.S. government regardless of the fact that the participation 
of Croatian troops consisted largely of non-combat missions.107 
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Table 3.   Overview of CAF Member Participation in UN Peace Support Missions108  
(From: 108) 
Besides UN peace support missions, during 2008 the CAF will devote special 
emphasis to equipping and training units declared for participation in NATO-led 
operations. These units include one motorized infantry company, one engineer platoon 
for mine clearing, one military police platoon, one special operations platoon, one 
Nuclear Biological Chemical (NBC) platoon for decontamination, two medical teams, 
one transport helicopter crew, and one engineer platoon for horizontal construction.109 
According to the CAF LTDP Croatia intends to gradually increase its 
participation in NATO-led missions to 600 members in 2010 and more than 700 
members after 2012.  Croatia will continue to participate in UN missions with up to 150 
personnel.  Between 2011 and 2015 Croatia plans to have 600 personnel with rotation or 
a reinforced battalion (up to 1000 CAF members) without rotation available for 
participation in NATO-led crisis response operations.  According to the plan, NATO and  
EU staff positions will be filled with around 100 CAF officers and non-commissioned 
officers (NCOs).  Moreover, the CAF will participate in NATO Response Force (NRF) 
and EU Battle Groups.110   
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2. Relations with Neighbor Countries 
Croatia has no major outstanding issues with its neighbors.  Key issues to date 
have been the implementation of the Dayton Accords, the return of refugees and 
displaced persons from the war of 1991-1995, and the resolution of border disputes with 
Slovenia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, and Montenegro. 
Relations between Croatia and Serbia have noticeably improved since Ivo 
Sanader, Croatia’s Prime Minister, visited Belgrade on 15 November 2004 and since 
Boris Tadić, Serbia’s president, visited Zagreb on 24 June 2007 and “apologized to 
Croats for war crimes committed by those ‘acting on behalf of my people.’”111  Relating 
to the issue of the return of refugees and displaced persons, Croatia has made significant, 
but not sufficient, progress.  Over 300,000 Serb refugees fled Croatia during the 1991-
1995 war, and about half of them have returned, according to the Croatian government.   
Regarding the Kosovo issue, Croatia cautiously postponed the recognition of 
Kosovo’s independence in order to not alienate Serbia by being among the first countries 
to do so.  Despite the fact that “Serbian President Boris Tadić warned that recognition of 
Kosovo’s independence would have ‘deep political and economic consequences’ for 
Croatia,”112 Croatia recognized Kosovo as an independent state on 19 March 2008.  
In the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia has played a largely positive role.  
Regarding its obligation to respect the Dayton Accords, Croatia has encouraged ethnic 
Croats in Bosnia to build their future within the country called Bosnia and Herzegovina 
rather than seek intervention from Croatia. Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina have 
undertaken efforts to resolve their issue over a coastal zone. There are some pending 
issues concerning the delimitation of land and river borders between these two countries. 
The implementation of the Agreement on Use of Ploče Port in Croatia is an ongoing 
process as well as talks about the agreement on settling property issues and transit 
through Neum, a small port in Bosnia and Herzegovina which divides the continental part 
                                                 
111 Eric Jansson, "Healing the Wounds of War," Financial Times, 12 November 2007, 
http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=1381600071&Fmt=7&clientId=65345&RQT=309&VName=PQD (accessed 20 
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112 Gallis and others, Enlargement Issues at NATO’s Bucharest Summit, 14-15.  
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of Croatia. Related to these issues are ongoing talks about the initiative by the Republic 
of Croatia on construction of a Komarna-Pelješac Bridge which would connect the 
Pelješac peninsula to the Croatian mainland.  Bosnia and Herzegovina has protested that 
it will close its way to international waters, and this plan has not been endorsed by the 
Bosnia and Herzegovina authorities.113 Negotiations are still being held.  Both countries 
are striving to resolve these issues in the near future. 
Relations between Croatia and Slovenia have fared well except for a disagreement 
over the maritime boundary between the two countries.  However, in August 2007, the 
two countries agreed to refer the dispute for arbitration by the International Court of 
Justice (ICJ) at The Hague.114 Croatia wants to avoid conflict with Slovenia, which, as a 
member of the European Union, could veto Croatia’s application for membership unless 
it agrees to Slovenia’s position on this issue. The Slovenian government denies exploiting 
its EU membership status in this fashion.115  
Croatia for a limited time unilaterally declared an “ecological and fisheries 
protection zone” in order to preserve fishing stocks and to reduce pollution. The zone 
covered an area of approximately 30 000 kilometers outside of Croatian territorial waters. 
On 1 January 2008 Croatia began asserting its jurisdiction in this area over the strong 
objections of neighboring Slovenia and Italy.  In order to preserve its ambitions to join 
the EU Zagreb suspended the zone on 15 March 2008.116 
Since 2003, Croatia, Albania and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 
have participated in the Adriatic Charter.  This is an American initiative that promotes 
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cooperation among the three countries in defense reforms and other areas in order to 
boost their prospects of NATO membership.  Croatia also participates in the Southeast 
Europe Defense Ministerial (SEDM) and the Southeastern Europe Brigade 
(SEEBRIG).117 
3. Cooperation with International Criminal Tribunal for War Crimes in 
the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) 
Croatia has significantly improved its cooperation with the ICTY since 2001.  
Until that time Croatia actively protected indicted individuals from the tribunal.  
Croatia’s unwillingness to cooperate with locating and transferring alleged war criminal 
General Ante Gotovina118 was a major obstacle in its efforts to join the EU and NATO.  
EU members deferred any initiative relating to the opening of membership talks with 
Croatia.  Croatia increased its efforts and captured Gotovina in 2005.119 Since the arrest 
and extradition of Gotovina to the ICTY, Croatia’s international political legitimacy has 
increased, and further integration with Euro-Atlantic institutions has been encouraged. 
Through Gotovina’s case, Croatia resolved the matter of ICTY cooperation, and this 
opened the road toward membership in Euro-Atlantic institutions.120  Interviews with 
NATO officials suggest that if Croatia had not captured Gotovina, Croatia would have 
never been invited to join NATO, regardless of the many other measures Croatia took in 
order to join NATO.121 
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D. CONCLUSION 
Croatia has made a significant change in its attitude toward Euro-Atlantic 
integration since 2000, when it decided that only membership in NATO could bring it 
into the family of states which enjoy the benefits of security in the Euro-Atlantic area.  
Actively participating in the NATO PfP Program and MAP, Croatia addressed NATO’s 
demands for more democratic civil-military relations and a reorganized, mobile, and 
modernized military.  Croatia's foreign policy has become much more aligned with that 
of NATO.  The Croatian government has made many efforts to reduce of the number of 
personnel and increase the professionalism of the active and reserve components of the 
CAF.  Croatia as a whole has made a significant effort to increase the mobility of the 
CAF through the modernization and procurement of new weaponry and military 
equipment.  After adopting the SDR, Croatia made leaps forward and developed the CAF 
LTDP, which was gradually implemented.  Croatia has shown its willingness to actively 
participate in peacekeeping missions led by NATO and the UN with the prospect of 
greater contributions in the future.  Croatia no longer has major issues with its neighbors.  
In order to achieve NATO membership, Croatia resolved outstanding issues of ICTY 
cooperation and thus finally made its objective feasible. 
Croatia, however, still has a number of areas for improvement.  Much will depend 
on the government’s ability to implement its recently proposed reforms in military force 
structure.  The most salient immediate problem is Croatia’s human, materiel and financial 
resource allocation.  Even upon full membership in NATO, this could affect Croatia’s 
ability to cooperate within the Alliance.  In its CAF LTDP, Croatia has provided a 
roadmap to solve these problems.  These problems require an effort from the whole 
society, the allocation of sufficient financial and materiel resources, and the time needed 
for implementation of the program.   Moreover, the CAF will not be fully modernized 
until 2015, and they are able to provide only small contributions to various peacekeeping 
operations.  Due to a lack of logistical capabilities, the CAF will likely continue to need 
support from their allies in order to actively participate in peacekeeping missions. A 
number of new Alliance member states already have provided meaningful contributions 
to Alliance security, and Croatia has showed its continuing willingness to contribute.  It is 
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evident that Croatia has made significant efforts in defense reform and foreign policy in 
order to join NATO.  It is also evident that the CAF are still not ready for the full 
spectrum of NATO missions.  NATO's decision to invite Croatia to join the Alliance is 
founded on the assessment that, although militarily Croatia is not yet ready to undertake 
all missions, it has the potential for greater contributions in the future.  It appears that the 
declaration of an independent Kosovo in February 2008, combined with the politico-
strategic situation in the region, may have helped to open the door for Croatia’s 
membership in the Alliance, because the NATO Allies wish to promote regional stability. 
 47
IV. BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA – CASE STUDY 
A. THE WAY TO NATO MEMBERSHIP 
The complex history of Bosnia has lasted more than a thousand years. The first 
surviving mention of Bosnia as a territory occurred in the politico-geographic handbook 
written in 958 A.D. by the Byzantine Emperor Constantine Porphyrogenitus.122  Bosnia 
emerged as an independent state for the first time in 1180.  This medieval Bosnian state 
was distinguished by three powerful rulers: Ban Kulin, Ban Stephen Kotromanić and 
King Stephen Tvrtko.123  As a consequence of the rise of Ottoman power, Bosnia was 
conquered by the Turkish Army in 1463 and remained under Ottoman rule for almost five 
centuries.  At the Congress of Berlin in 1878, it was decided that Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, “while still in theory under Ottoman suzerainty, would be occupied and 
administered by Austria-Hungary.”124  Bosnia remained under Austro–Hungarian rule 
until 1914, when World War I (WWI) was initiated in Sarajevo by the assassination of 
Austro–Hungarian Archduke Franz Ferdinand.  After WWI Bosnia become a part of the 
Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes until January 1929.  At that time King 
Alexander suspended the constitution and changed the name of the country to 
Yugoslavia.   
In the wake of World War II (WWII), despite the fact that Yugoslav leaders tried 
to implement a conciliatory policy towards Germany, Yugoslavia was invaded on 6 April 
1941. After eleven days the Yugoslav Army capitulated to the German High 
Command.125 In November 1943, at the time of the founding session of the Territorial 
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Antifascist Council for the National Liberation of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
(ZAVNOBIH), Bosnia and Herzegovina was promised that it would have separate status 
within Yugoslavia as a “country of Serbs, Croats and Muslims ─ ‘their common and 
indivisible homeland’  ─ over which no single national group had exclusive rights.” 126   
Following WWII Bosnia and Herzegovina was one of six republics in the 
Yugoslav federation.  Following the decision by the people of Bosnia and Herzegovina to 
establish an independent country, which was made via a national plebiscite in March 
1992, the Serb-led Yugoslav National Army commenced a siege of Sarajevo using 
snipers with telescopic sights to kill civilians as they tried to find food and water.127  This 
aggression could be characterized by two features that, according to Hungarian analyst 
Andras Riedlmayer, “had little to do with military objectives:  the mass expulsion of 
civilians driven from their homes, robbed, raped, and murdered for being of the ‘wrong’ 
ethnicity and religion; and the deliberate targeting and destruction of cultural, religious, 
and historic landmarks by nationalist extremists.”128  
After many atrocities, including actions condemned by authoritative observers as 
genocide,129 the long nightmare in Bosnia and Herzegovina formally ceased with the 
signing of the Dayton Agreement in November 1995.  This agreement stopped the war, 
but “established what has been described as ‘one of the most complicated and wasteful 
systems of government ever devised.’”130  Nevertheless, while still struggling to build a 
functional state, Bosnia and Herzegovina has made progress in many fields relating to the 
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stabilization and reconstruction process.  One of its greatest achievements is defense 
reform.  This reform was one of the main preconditions for Bosnia and Herzegovina to 
begin its integration into Euro-Atlantic organizations. The process of integration includes 
PfP membership, which is widely regarded as a first step towards both Euro-Atlantic and 
European integration.   
The Bosnian Presidency first expressed the goal of membership in European and 
Euro-Atlantic security institutions in June 2001, during a visit by NATO Secretary 
General Lord Robertson.  Lord Robertson outlined many reforms needed for Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, such as “the adoption of a State Defense Law, State command over the 
armed forces, democratic and parliamentary oversight of the armed forces, the formation 
of the BiH [Bosnia and Herzegovina] Ministry of Defense (MoD), transparent military 
budgets, common equipping and training standards, strengthening of state-level 
Institutions and the fulfillment of obligations to ICTY [International Criminal Tribunal 
for Former Yugoslavia] under the Dayton Peace Accords.”131  After a huge effort 
undertaken in a few years, and despite failing to obtain an invitation to join PFP at the 
Istanbul Summit in 2004, Bosnia and Herzegovina was invited to join PFP at the Riga 
Summit on 29 November 2006.132  
In the period immediately following its entry into the PfP program, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina demonstrated its commitment to fulfill PfP goals.  In this regard, the 
activities that have been completed by Bosnia and Herzegovina up to the beginning of 
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BiH Presentation Document for PfP was developed and submitted. 
Individual Partnership Program (BiH IPP) was developed by BiH and 
accepted and approved by the NAC and BiH.  
NATO Security Agreement was signed and certified.  
The National Security Authority was established to implement 
provisions of the Security Agreement in order to be able to exchange 
classified information between NATO and BiH. 
The ePRIME (Partnership Real-Time Information, Management, and 
Exchange System) communication system was established in BiH.  
BiH joined the Planning and Review Process (PARP); 31 PARP- 
related BiH partnership goals with NATO have been identified.  
The PfP Status of Forces Agreement (PfP SOFA) and its Additional 
Protocols have been signed and ratified. 
The NATO Co-ordination Team at the level of the BiH Council of 
Ministers was established. 
The procedure for the appointment of the Head of the BiH Mission to 
NATO was accomplished. 
 The procedures for opening the BiH Mission to NATO HQ in 
Brussels were begun.  
The second BiH IPP (Bosnia and Herzegovina Individual Partnership 
Program) for 2008-2009 was prepared. 
At the end of 2007 the BiH Presidency requested the enhancement of 
co-operation between NATO and BiH at the level of IPAP (Individual 
Partnership Action Plan).  
NATO approved the institutionalization of co-operation with BiH at 
the level of IPAP. 
 
Table 4.   Bosnia and Herzegovina’s commitment to PfP goals 133 (After: 133) 
 
These efforts have been welcomed by NATO countries, which have encouraged 
ambitious and substantive Action Plans to further the Euro-Atlantic aspirations of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina and which will offer assistance in reform efforts towards this goal.  At 
the Bucharest Summit on 3 April 2008, NATO members decided to invite Bosnia and 
Herzegovina to begin an Intensified Dialogue (ID), which will include discussions on 
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political, military, financial, and security issues.134  This was another step forward to 
NATO membership for Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
B. DEFENSE REFORM 
1. Achievements  
In a 2004 interview, the High Representative/European Union Special 
Representative (HR/EUSR) in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Paddy Ashdown, said: 
‘[I]f there is one issue that everybody in every ethnicity, every political 
party and every corner of the country is agreed upon, it is that Bosnia and 
Herzegovina’s ultimate destination is Europe’:  so there is a clear 
understanding across the society that ‘the only possible future for this 
country is via integration in Euro-Atlantic structures.’135  
This shared understanding created sufficient preconditions for successful defense 
reforms in Bosnia and Herzegovina.  Defense reform was “one of the top-priority 
objectives for both NATO members and Partnership countries in the Euro-Atlantic 
Partnership Council/Partnership for Peace (EAPC/PfP) community.”136  As noted in the 
Partnership for Peace Presentation Document, “the reform of the defense system, as an 
exceptionally important element of the state structure of Bosnia and Herzegovina, focuses 
on two key issues:  1) establishment of a single defense system under efficient command 
and control of functional state institutions, and 2) restructuring of the Armed Forces to 
enable the implementation of legitimate defense goals of Bosnia and Herzegovina and its 
foreign political aspirations in terms of security, specifically collective defense and 
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security.”137  After a great deal of effort was undertaken in just a few short years, a single 
defense establishment and a single military force emerged in Bosnia and Herzegovina.  
a. Civil Military Relations 
Bosnia and Herzegovina was created according to the Dayton Peace 
Agreement, and it is characterized by a weak central state with two relatively strong 
entities:  1) the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (FBiH) and 2) the Republika 
Srpska (RS).  Bosnia and Herzegovina therefore has an unusually complex state structure, 
including a complicated defense structure.  At the end of the war in 1995, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina formally had two armies:  the FBiH Army and the RS Army.  In reality the 
FBiH Army was deeply divided along ethnic lines so these two armies actually 
represented three armies:  one Bosniac, one Croat (as components of the FBiH Army), 
and one Serbian (the RS Army).  This resulted in two separate defense systems for the 
two entities comprising the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina.138  Thus, the central state 
did not have effective control over the military, be it command and control or oversight, 
because the separate military forces were organized and commanded at the level of the 
FBiH and the level of the RS, as two official entities of the state of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina.  James R. Locher III, then co-chairman of the Defense Reform Commission 
of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Michael Donley, then a special adviser to the Defense 
Reform Commission, noted that 
The communist inheritance included highly politicized command 
elements, weak civilian control below the head of state, almost no 
connectivity or communication between the Defense Ministries and 
general staffs, lack of transparency in budgeting and administration, and 
                                                 
137 Bosnia and Herzegovina - Partnership for Peace - Presentation Document (Sarajevo:  Ministry of 
Defense of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2006), 6; http://www.mod.gov.ba/eng/dwn/prez_dokum_e.pdf (accessed 10 
September 2008).          
138Merijn Hartog, “Defence Reform and PfP Aspirations in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in Serbia and 
Montenegro,” in Jos Boonstra, ed., Defence Reform Initiative for Bosnia and Herzegovina /Serbia and 
Montenegro, the DRINA Project (Groningen, The Netherlands:  The Centre for European Security Studies, 
2005), 2; http://www.cess.org/publications/occasionals/pdfs/occasionals2.pdf (accessed 1 September 2008).          
 53
weak parliamentary oversight.  The post-war environment was 
characterized by fragmented political authority and lack of trust.139  
The best indication of such weak civil military relations in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina at that time was the illegal export by Republika Srpska of arms technology 
to Iraq in August 2002, more commonly known as the Orao affair.140  The public and 
international awareness of such poor state control over the military on an entity level was 
simply unacceptable.  Paddy Ashdown, speaking on the Orao affair on 21 February 2003, 
noted:  “This scandal… goes to the very heart of inadequate control of the Armed Forces 
and the military industrial complex… We need to assess… the degree and extent of the 
systematic failure [and] to take action that responds to these issues.”141 
This scandal highlighted the fact that contemporary legal, organizational, 
and institutional arrangements for the management and oversight of the armed forces of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina had not been adequate.  An essential reform priority was the 
adoption of a legal framework in order to “strengthening State-level command and 
control and establishing full democratic civilian oversight and control over all armed 
forces and defense structures.”142  On 9 May 2003, the High Representative established 
the Defense Reform Commission (DRC) in order to recommend specific reforms to the 
defense system in Bosnia and Herzegovina.143 The DRC’s work resulted in the adoption 
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of the Defense Law of Bosnia and Herzegovina on 1 December 2003.144 This law clearly 
codified state-level command and control of the Bosnia and Herzegovina Armed Forces, 
created the Bosnia and Herzegovina Ministry of Defense, and established mechanisms for 
Bosnia and Herzegovina parliamentary control and oversight of the Armed Forces.145  
This also resulted in the creation of the “Joint Committee for Defense and Security Policy 
and Monitoring of the Work of Defense and Security Structures on the BiH Level” in the 
BiH Parliamentary Assembly.146  This was the initial step toward effective consolidation 
of civil military relations by establishing the foundation of democratic oversight and 
control over the Armed Forces. This is an ongoing process that has become progressively 
more effective.  
b. Military reform 
Within the period between May and September 2003, after a long period 
of consensus building and negotiation, the DRC reached unanimous agreement on a 293-
page report setting out the way forward.147  The Path to Partnership for Peace report 
proposed a new defense structure for the Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina.  It 
distinguished between two chains of command: Operational and Administrative.148 The 
Operational Chain of Command is responsible for the employment of military forces, 
while under the Administrative Chain of Command the two entity Ministries of Defense 
are responsible for organizing, manning, equipping and training the respective entity 
armies.  This structure was supported by a new Bosnia and Herzegovina Defense Law, 
though it was just an intermediate step in a longer-term vision to consolidate the entity 
forces in a single national military establishment. 
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In the unofficial benchmark document issued by the North Atlantic 
Council, aside from legislative benchmarks, there were also personnel, institutional, 
restructuring, budgetary, and non-DRC benchmarks.  The new national Minister of 
Defense, Nikola Radovanović, and two of his deputies took office on 15 March 2004.  
The changing structure of the armed forces requires a reduction of forces in order to meet 
the optimum size for the political and economic realities in Bosnia and Herzegovina.  At 
the end of the war in 1995 the process of downsizing commenced with an aim of 
reducing the number of men under arms at that time (250,000).   By 1998 this number 
had been reduced to 35,000 and in 2002 the total was 19,800.  In 2004 the Bosnia and 
Herzegovina Presidency adopted a decision on the size and structure of the Armed Forces 
of Bosnia and Herzegovina.149  According to this decision the two entity armed forces 
together would be limited to a total of 12,000 soldiers (8,000 soldiers for the FBiH Army 
and 4,000 soldiers for the RS Army).  Moreover, the number of conscripts was initially 
reduced to 12,600 (8,400 in the FBiH Army and 4,200 in the RS Army) and the reservist 
strength was set at 60,000 members (40,000 in the FBiH Army and 20,000 in the RS 
Army).150  This represents a reduction of 95 percent in less than ten years, and of 66 
percent in less than three years.  As James Staples noted, “This is unrivalled in modern 
times.”151   
According to a DRC report based on international estimates, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina’s spending on defense was bigger than that of other European countries of 
similar size, which is noteworthy in view of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s limited economy.  
Inability to afford a military establishment of such a large size was the main reason why 
reducing the size of the armed forces and resolving outstanding personnel issues were 
major priorities for reform.  Without significant reform in the defense system Bosnia and 
Herzegovina would remain incapable of fulfilling PfP membership requirements.  Among 
the non-DRC benchmarks for PfP was full co-operation with the ICTY, which had been a 
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long standing prerequisite for the acceptance of Bosnia and Herzegovina into European 
and Euro-Atlantic structures.  On 18 June 2004, Nikola Radovanović, Minister of 
Defense of Bosnia and Herzegovina, noted that “the main obstacle towards BiH joining 
PfP is lack of co-operation with the Hague tribunal.”152  
In order to be successful, all reforms require an effective implementation 
process.  The DRC has given considerable attention to implementation and recommended 
the establishment of a Transition Management Office, with duties to oversee, assist, and 
support the implementation process of defense reform.153  Defense reform had to 
continue in order to establish a modern and affordable defense system.  By mid-2004 
defense reform had already greatly advanced beyond the “Dayton agenda.”  During 2004 
and 2005 defense reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina was, according to some observers, a 
“coercive process.”  The local officials were coerced by NATO because they had blocked 
defense reform in early 2004.  Local officials had not nominated qualified candidates for 
top positions, and had not secured funding for the state-level institutions.  Moreover, the 
entity parliaments had not acted to match their laws to the new national state laws.154  
Defense reform processes in the Western Balkans and elsewhere in the 
Euro-Atlantic region are usually led, observed, and influenced by international 
organizations.  Defense reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina was observed by NATO as the 
DRC co-chair.  In the summer of 2005 the entities had agreed to combine their armed 
forces and defense ministries and adopt the requisite constitutional amendments.  At the 
end of 2005 the Parliaments had adopted proposed laws regarding the transfer of all 
defense responsibilities and personnel from the two entities to the central state.155   
In 2006 defense reform continued to progress, following the country’s 
adoption in December 2005 of the Defense Law, which reflects the recommendations of 
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the Defense Reform Commission in order to meet the objective of creating a single 
military force.156  In January 2006 all defense-related tasks and personnel were 
transferred to the State Ministry of Defense.  In June 2006, the presidency made a 
decision on the definitive size, structure, and stationing of the Armed Forces.157  
Conscription was terminated in January 2006, and the Armed Forces are now an all-
volunteer force.  Since July 2006 the approved Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
structure has 10,000 professional military personnel, 5,000 active reserve members, and 
1,000 civilians.158 
The force structure is composed of two commands: the Operational 
Command and the Support Command, which are subordinated to the Chief of the Joint 
Staff.  Under the Operational Command there are three Infantry Brigades, an Air Force 
and Air Defense Brigade, and the Tactical Support Brigade.  Under the Support 
Command there are three subordinated commands:  the Personnel Management 
Command, the Training and Doctrine Command, and the Logistic Command.  According 
to the Bosnia and Herzegovina Constitution, the Commander in Chief of the Armed 
Forces is comprised by all three members of the collective Bosnia and Herzegovina 
Presidency, who are, by law, to perform together the function of Commander in Chief.  
Considering the command responsibilities from top to bottom within the adopted 
command structure in Bosnia and Herzegovina’s defense system, the chain of command 
goes from the Bosnia and Herzegovina Presidency through the Minister of Defense to the 
Chief of the Joint Staff and on to the Commanders of the subordinate Operational 
Command and Support Command and then to the commanders of subordinate 
headquarters and units.159 The success in defense reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina to 
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date has provided all the necessary preconditions for its implementation, the 
consolidation of existing personnel and material infrastructure, and the modernization of 
all capacities in the near future in order to adjust them to NATO standards.   
2. Plans for the Future 
Despite the fact that certain element of the defense structure of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina were inherited from the previous communist regime and the fact that the 
country is still struggling with open wounds produced by three-and-a-half years of war in 
1992-1995, this country is still managing to meet nearly all of NATO’s expectations.  
Achievements in defense reform are remarkable.  According to the NATO Headquarters 
Sarajevo Commander, Major General Richard Wightman, U.S. Army, “Defense reform 
in particular remains one of the key reform successes in BiH [Bosnia and Herzegovina] 
and continues to serve as an example of what can be achieved when there is unity, co-
operation and dialogue among all peoples.”160  Defense reform in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina is in the implementation phase.  So far defense reform has been focused 
more on structural (or “hardware”) changes in the system than on culture and mentality 
(or “software”) changes.  As a former Naval Postgraduate School student, Lieutenant 
Colonel Janos Szonyegi, Hungarian Army, noted,  
In an established democracy, with strong traditions of civilian control of 
the armed forces, the process of defense reform can be limited to ‘a 
change of hardware’, like restructuring or professionalization.  In post-
communist societies, however, the biggest challenge is arguably the 
‘change of software’, namely the whole culture and mentality of the 
defense establishment.161   
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Bosnia and Herzegovina is a country which indeed needs refurbished “software” 
in order to be ready for the future.  This is a process which needs a substantial allocation 
of time, effort, and resources.  
According to an assessment by the Jane’s organization, the Armed Forces of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina at the present time are not capable of conventional combat 
operations on any scale.  Regardless of the many achievements thus far, the transition to a 
unified military establishment has been completed only on paper.  The military is still 
organized according to separate doctrines; and it remains politically divided, differently 
equipped, and operationally ill-matched and uncoordinated.  Owing to these deficiencies, 
the situation in the Armed Forces cannot be corrected any time soon, given the low levels 
of funding and a widespread public view of the Armed Forces as a low priority.  Jane's 
considers Bosnia and Herzegovina “a deeply divided nation, with serious implications for 
the armed forces.”162  Among the positive trends that may further boost the 
transformation of the Bosnia and Herzegovina Armed Forces are the opportunities 
presented by entry into PfP and ID.   
The stated desire of the Armed Forces to meaningfully participate in multinational 
operations should reinforce this trend.  Jane's considers that “The hard work required to 
prepare for demanding UN, EU, NATO or coalition operations may enhance national 
identity and deflect tendencies to look for regional or ethnic authentication.”163  As US 
Army Major General Richard Wightman, then commander of the NATO Headquarters 
Sarajevo, noted, 
defense reform also entails the obligations that BiH [Bosnia and 
Herzegovina] has incurred as well as the commitments that have been 
made within the framework of PfP, including reform goals within the 
Planning and Review Process (PARP), as well as wider security and 
political obligations that BiH will incur as the Individual Partnership 
Action Plan (IPAP) process develops.164   
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In the IPAP for 2008-2010, Bosnia and Herzegovina addresses the necessity to 
initiate a Defence Review by the end of 2008. This Defence Review will aim at the 
development of affordable, flexible, modern, and capable Armed Forces that reflect the 
security requirements of the country and that are capable of sustaining operations within 
available resources.  The Defence Review is expected to provide the basic preconditions 
for future defence reform.  This includes the identification of necessary capabilities for 
the defence of the country, assistance to civilian authorities, and participation in peace 
support operations.  According to the IPAP, “Other aspects of Defence Review will 
include personnel issues (relations between officers, NCOs and professional soldiers), 
education and training policy, logistic capacities for support, plans for equipment 
modernisation, issue of military bases and disposal of surplus armaments and military 
equipment.”165  As a priority in the Defence Review, Bosnia and Herzegovina plans to 
update its Defense Planning Policy and develop its Defense Resources Management 
Policy. This will create preconditions for the Bosnia and Herzegovina Ministry of 
Defense to develop policies and regulations that will support a multi-year planning 
system.  Croatia has already established its own defense planning system on the levels of 
strategic planning, developmental planning and operative planning. The same system 
could be used in Bosnia and Herzegovina as well.166  Moreover, while relying on these 
policies, the Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina Joint Staff will develop a defense 
strategy in order to define activities and procedures to fulfill assigned missions in an 
effective and financially sustainable manner.167   
Bosnia and Herzegovina plans to establish military education systems organized 
in a way which would provide highly educated and trained personnel capable of speaking 
the same language as current NATO member states.168  Various educational programs 
                                                 
165 BiH NATO Individual Partnership Action Plan (Period 2008-2010) (Sarajevo: Ministry of Defense 
of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2008), 12.          
166 Annual Exchange of Information on Defense Planning 2008 - VIENNA DOCUMENT 1999 
(Zagreb, Croatia: Ministry of Defense [2008]), 11,  http://www.morh.hr/katalog/documents/OSCE_2008.pdf 
(accessed 30 June 2008). 
167 Bosnia and Herzegovina - NATO Individual Partnership Action Plan - Presentation Document, 25.          
168 Staff of the Centre for European Security Studies, The Western Balkan Candidates for NATO 
Membership and Partnership, 17.          
 61
have been started, but poor selection criteria for qualified personnel for these programs 
have led to sub-optimal results.  In choosing people for studies abroad, language skills 
have often been more important than the technical qualifications for success in the 
program.  Graduates of these courses have been employed in positions that have not 
taken full advantage of their new training and qualifications.  Professional officers are 
aware of the necessity for recruitment of new personnel and cadets and the fact that there 
is no proper personnel planning and career system in place.  The assessments of 
professional military officers in the Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina suggest 
that some period of time will be needed before the organization as a whole will be able to 
accomplish the tasks facing the Bosnia and Herzegovina Armed Forces.169   
In order to enhance and to make its contribution to the overall NATO/PfP training 
and education system, Bosnia and Herzegovina ─ with the sponsorship of the United 
Kingdom ─ established the Peace Support Operations Training Centre (PSOTC) on 10 
November 2003 in Butmir, near Sarajevo.170  This center officially received the status of 
a PfP training centre in November 2007.171  Bosnia and Herzegovina seeks to further 
develop the expertise and professionalism of the Armed Forces of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina through cooperation with the Baltic Defense College (BALTDEFCOL), the 
George C. Marshall Centre for Security Studies, the NATO School in Oberammergau, 
the Geneva Centre for Security Policy, and the NATO Defense College in Rome. Bosnia 
and Herzegovina will also continue to send students to other institutions that have also 
made great contributions to professional development and specialized training in 
countries such as China, Croatia, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Japan, 
Malaysia, Norway, Romania, Serbia, Slovenia, Switzerland, Turkey, and the United 
Kingdom.  The United States of America, through the Foreign Military Financing (FMF) 
Program, the International Military Education and Training (IMET) Program, and the 
Joint Contact Team Program (JCTP), contributes significant military assistance to the 
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Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina and will, it may be hoped, remain Sarajevo’s 
key strategic partner.172  Bosnia and Herzegovina is committed to developing and 
implementing a system based on the existing civilian education system combined with 
basic military training in the miliary units.173  
The unsatisfactory age structure of personnel, with more older than younger 
officers for certain positions, within the Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina is 
similar to Croatia’s existing “inverted personnel pyramid with too many chiefs and no 
Indians (and few coming in).” These structural shortcomings have proved to be among 
the main reasons for low efficiency within the organization.  A military organization has 
to have the right proportion of professional ranks at all levels in order to fulfill its 
mission.174  This is the reason why human resources management is considered a crucial 
requirement for future effectiveness.  Experience with countries in transition has proved 
that the leadership’s determination is crucial, because the personnel in big organizations 
such as defense ministries and military services are resistant to any kind of change.175  
The system should provide a framework whereby the selection of personnel qualified to 
be promoted to higher ranks will be done according to their abilities and educational 
achievements.  An effective system should make clear to all individuals what is expected 
from them and what they need to do to develop their skills in order to make progress in 
their careers.   
Ethnic representation principles complicate the personnel management system in 
the Bosnia and Herzegovina Armed Forces.  Certain positions have to be manned by 
personnel of particular nationalities regardless of the fact that the qualifications for 
particular duties are questionable for some of them.  Excessive reliance on ethnic 
representation principles has resulted in increasingly hollow units in the structure of the 
Armed Forces.  Particular ethnic groups have not been able to provide sufficient numbers 
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of personnel.  This problem has been exacerbated by the necessity for a balanced 
representation of different ethnic groups in the senior military positions at different levels 
of commands.  Human resource management in Bosnia and Herzegovina will have to  
develop effective mechanisms in order to provide functional personnel management in a 
society whose multiethnic composition is still under the stress of ethnic representation 
principles.176    
Regarding military infrastructure, there are plans to reduce the number of weapon 
storage sites and ammunition storage sites in Bosnia and Herzegovina.  Sites that will not 
serve defence roles will be transferred to civilian authorities for future use.  The status of 
defence property with no prospective interest and the status of temporarily retained 
immovable property, along with measures reducing the number of locations in 
accordance with the Bosnia and Herzegovina Presidency Decision, are planned to be 
resolved by the end of 2009.  The consolidation of military infrastructure is considered a 
crucial element contributing to the operational readiness of the Armed Forces of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina and will be analyzed within the Defence Review.177 
In order to provide transparent defense planning and stable defense budgeting in 
the future, BiH intends to introduce the Planning, Programming and Budgeting Execution 
System (PPBES).178  The budget in 2007 was 285 million convertible marks (KM), 
which is about 1.5% of national GDP.  Plans are in place for the period 2008-2010, to 
gradually increase the defense budget as well as its proportion of GDP, from 1.69% in 
2008 to 1.9% of GDP in 2010.  The published draft budget for 2008 includes personnel 
costs of about 81%, operation and maintenance costs of about 15.7%, and procurement 
and construction costs of about 3.3% of the overall budget.  Personnel costs are planned 
to be reduced to about 71 percent of the overall budget in 2010.  Currently, the budget for 
2008 does not incorporate major programs of modernization of armaments and military 
equipment.  Because defense expenditures progressively increase, the budget required for 
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2009 is 381.2 million KM, and for 2010 it will be 433.2 million KM.179  The allocation 
of greater amounts for personnel costs than for the costs of infrastructure, equipment, and 
training, requires more attention.   The defense budget has to be structured in order to 
further decrease personnel costs and increase funds for training and modernization.  
Bosnia and Herzegovina is unlikely to undertake any significant defense procurement 
through at least 2010 due to other demands on its limited defense resources.  
Bosnia and Herzegovina is strongly committed to attaining full NATO 
membership.  In order to fulfil its commitment, Bosnia and Herzegovina has an 
obligation to improve its coordination with NATO.  The defence reform process in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina is in reality initiated and led by external actors─above all, 
NATO.  The Alliance has served as the driving force but has also caused some dizziness 
on the side of Bosnia and Herzegovina, because of the multiplicity of new NATO 
requirements.  According to officials in the Ministry of Defence of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, this fact has also affected the relationship between NATO staff and 
Ministry of Defence staff in Sarajevo.  Some NATO staff members have taken a superior 
position in their relations with the staff in the Ministry of Defence of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, and this has sometimes caused friction in cooperation.180   
Moreover, the fulfillment of the many obligations regarding various NATO 
programs needs more initiative from the entire society of Bosnia and Herzegovina.  In 
accordance with the Bosnia and Herzegovina Presidency Decision on strengthening co-
operation with NATO at the IPAP level in order to improve inter-ministerial co-operation 
with NATO, in September 2007 Sarajevo established the Bosnia and Herzegovina 
Council of Ministers NATO Co-ordination Team (NCT).  In 2008 Bosnia and 
Herzegovina plans to establish a Mission to NATO HQ in Brussels and a Liaison Team 
in the Partnership Co-ordination Cell (PCC) in Mons.181 
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Overall, specific tasks in the medium term will include full implementation of the 
agreed force structure in accordance with the Bosnia and Herzegovina Presidency 
decision that defines the current size and structure of the country’s armed forces.  In other 
words, the implementation should include well-developed plans, policies and doctrine as 
a foundation for establishing the main preconditions for development of units adequately 
equipped, trained, and supported by the full range of defense operating systems such as 
personnel and resource management: planning, programming, and budgeting; education 
and training; and acquisition and procurement.  All of these steps will be accompanied by 
the effective transfer of movable property and the implementation of all requirements 
related to the storage of weapons and ammunition.  These challenging tasks will require 
decisive action for their full implementation.182  
C. FOREIGN POLICY 
1. Participation in Peacekeeping Missions  
The formal eligibility criteria for NATO membership were initially outlined in the 
1995 Study on NATO Enlargement.  According to this document, the criteria include the 
ability and willingness to make a military contribution to the alliance. The Bosnia and 
Herzegovina - Partnership for Peace - Presentation Document reiterated the 
government’s policy that “members and units of the Armed Forces of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina have contributed to and will continue to actively contribute to international 
peace missions, in accordance with the requirements of the international community, its 
own human and technical resources, and decisions of relevant institutions of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina.”183 
The government of Bosnia and Herzegovina understands that, in order to join the 
NATO Alliance, the state has to express its willingness and readiness to participate in 
NATO-led peacekeeping operations.  Bosnia and Herzegovina plans to develop and 
establish the Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina Operational Capabilities Concept 
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(OCC), which is going to be a significant challenge accompanied by the overall defense 
reform process that is already underway.  The creation of all necessary preconditions for 
training and equipping nominated units in accordance with NATO requirements and 
standards is a priority in the near term.  Bosnia and Herzegovina has nominated the EOD 
(explosive ordnance disposal) unit and infantry units for participation in NATO and non-
NATO-led exercises and crisis management operations.  Since June 2005, the EOD Unit 
has successfully completed five six-month rotations participating in Operation Iraqi 
Freedom in Iraq.184  In addition to an EOD unit, on 27 August 2008 Bosnia and 
Herzegovina deployed an infantry platoon on a sustainable basis.  The unit’s mission is to 
provide security for the “Victoria” military base in Iraq.185  Bosnia and Herzegovina’s 
officers also participate in UN observation missions in Ethiopia-Eritrea (UNMEE) and 
the Congo (MONUC).  Besides military officers, members of police structures in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina have participated in UN missions in Liberia (UNMIL), Haiti 
(MINUSTAH), Sudan (UNMIS) and Cyprus (UNFICYP), and a diplomat has been 
appointed head of the OSCE (Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe) 
Mission to Turkmenistan.186 
Bosnia and Herzegovina has not participated in any NATO-led missions to date; 
and participation in such missions should be a priority in order to improve cooperation 
with NATO.  Current reform processes, including problems with shortages and 
inadequacy of equipment as well as the lack of deployable logistic support, are currently 
the main factors that severely constrain the operational capabilities of the Armed Forces.  
But as these problems are resolved, Bosnia and Herzegovina plans to assign more units to 
operations outside the national territory.  One of the constraints that puts additional 
pressure on already limited financial resources is the fact that deployments abroad are 
currently covered from the defense budget.  Bosnia and Herzegovina should explore 
possibilities to finance deployments of military units outside the national territory from 
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budgets other than the defense budget.  This would leave more consistent funding to be 
allocated for the improvement of the training, equipment and modernization of the 
Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina.187 
2. Relations with Neighboring Countries 
Bosnia and Herzegovina's relations with its neighbors Croatia, Montenegro, and 
Serbia have been fairly stable since the signing of the Dayton Agreement in 1995.  
According to Bosnia and Herzegovina's foreign policy, the improvement of co-operation 
with neighboring countries, based on common interests and respect for sovereignty and 
territorial integrity, is among its highest priorities.  In order to enhance its own foreign 
policy, Bosnia and Herzegovina intends to initiate a series of activities to intensify 
cooperation in all areas of mutual interest.  Some of the crucial areas for cooperation are 
economic, cultural, political, and security concerns, as well as efforts to resolve issues 
related to the demarcation of borders with neighboring countries.  For the sake of strong 
cooperation with NATO, Bosnia and Herzegovina is committed to constructively act in 
order to resolve any kind of specific issues with its neighbors.188 
With respect to the relations between Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia, there 
are a few issues that may influence Bosnia and Herzegovina’s prospects for NATO 
membership.  Among the most salient are the possible implications of Kosovo’s 
declaration of independence.  Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina agreed to open full 
diplomatic relations in 1996.189  According to the formal eligibility criteria for NATO 
membership, “States which have ethnic disputes or external territorial disputes, including 
irredentist claims, or internal jurisdictional disputes, must settle those disputes by 
peaceful means in accordance with OSCE (Organization for Security and Cooperation in 
Europe) principles.  Resolution of such disputes would be a factor in determining whether 
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to invite a state to join the Alliance.”190  Bosnia and Herzegovina should thoroughly 
comply with this principle.  According to the General Framework Agreement for Peace in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Republic of 
Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (the “Parties”), recognizing the need for 
a comprehensive settlement to bring an end to the tragic conflict in the region:  “fully 
respecting the sovereign equality of one another, shall settle disputes by peaceful means, 
and shall refrain from any action, by threat or use of force or otherwise, against the 
territorial integrity or political independence of Bosnia and Herzegovina or any other 
State.”191 
This, however, does not mean that territorial aspirations by neighboring countries 
such as Serbia have disappeared.  Milosevic’s election defeat in 2000 left his successors 
with a choice of whether to take advantage of the Russian veto over Kosovo’s future 
status (and to continue to insist on maintaining Republika Srpska as a separate entity 
within Bosnia, with the potential option to promote its independence or to seek its 
annexation to Serbia) or to seek a settlement of Serbia’s outstanding “national” issues and 
turn the country towards a European and Euro-Atlantic vocation.192  This choice still has 
not been made by Belgrade. Serbia is still struggling with defining its political and 
strategic course towards a better future.  Problems could arise in Bosnia because some 
political factions in Republika Srpska may claim that it, like Kosovo, should declare 
independence.  The issue of Republika Srpska’s status, which some erroneously regard as 
parallel to that of Kosovo, is in fact substantially different from that of Kosovo.  The 
Kosovo issue is the product of a lengthy negotiation on the international level while the 
creation of Republika Srpska is a result of the Dayton Agreement and of the process by 
which Bosnia and Herzegovina was established.   
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Moreover, Serb secession from Bosnia and Herzegovina, likely followed by Croat 
secession, would create a rump Islamic Republic dependent on the Muslim world, a result 
that neither Washington nor Brussels (nor Belgrade, nor Zagreb) wants.193  The top 
international envoy in Bosnia and Herzegovina, High Representative Miroslav Lajčak, 
has repeatedly stressed that the Dayton Peace Agreement, which ended the 1992-1995 
war, guarantees Bosnia and Herzegovina’s territorial integrity and does not provide for 
border changes. “Republika Srpska does not have the right to secede from Bosnia, [and] 
at the same time no one can unilaterally abolish Republika Srpska,” Lajčak said in 
February 2008.194  The stakes in the Balkans are as high as ever, owing in part to the 
refusal of Belgrade and Moscow to recognize Kosovo’s independence.195 Kosovo made a 
historic choice by declaring independence.  Serbia will have to make its own historic 
choice:  either for a better future as part of the European Union (and other European and 
Euro-Atlantic institutions), or for isolation, stagnation, and decline.  That choice will 
significantly affect the prospects for security and prosperity in this part of Europe.  
Overall, the relations between Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republic of Serbia 
have been marked with continued mutual visits of state officials, at all levels.  Bosnia and 
Herzegovina is willing to continue to seek solutions together with the Republic of Serbia 
in terms of further development of bilateral relations in all fields, such as the demarcation 
of the border between Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republic of Serbia and the 
resolution of pending issues concerning the demarcation of the border in the area of the 
Drina River.  The fact that these two states are bounded by the same trade area is the 
main reason that economic and trade co-operation between the Republic of Serbia and 
Bosnia and Herzegovina has to be developed; it is in the interests of both states.196  
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18-19.          
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With respect to relations between Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia, Bosnia 
and Herzegovina continues to seek solutions for pending issues, as discussed in Chapter 
III.  Co-operation in border management; combating organized crime, illegal trafficking 
and smuggling; and provision of support in legal matters continue to be the main areas of 
interest for improvement. 
Regarding relations between Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republic of 
Montenegro, there are no remarkable issues that could have a significant impact on 
relations between the two states.  Sarajevo supports the initiation of procedures for the 
clarification of borders between Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republic of 
Montenegro.  In order to affirm the mutual desire of both countries for further 
enhancement of co-operation, the Embassy of the Republic of Montenegro in Sarajevo 
and the Embassy of Bosnia and Herzegovina in Podgorica opened in December 2007.197  
3. Cooperation with International Criminal Tribunal for War Crimes in 
the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) 
Cooperation with the ICTY (International Criminal Tribunal for Former 
Yugoslavia) is a longstanding obligation for Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia.  This 
was a prerequisite for PfP membership of these two countries.  At NATO’s Istanbul 
Summit in June 2004, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia were not invited to PfP 
membership because of unsatisfactory cooperation with the ICTY.  At the Riga Summit 
in November 2006 this threshold condition was considered in the following way: 
Taking into account the importance of long term stability in the Western 
Balkans and acknowledging the progress made so far by Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Montenegro and Serbia, we have today invited these three 
countries to join Partnership for Peace and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership 
Council. In taking this step, we reaffirm the importance we attach to the 
values and principles set out in the EAPC and PfP basic documents, and 
notably expect Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina to cooperate fully with 
the ICTY. We will closely monitor their respective efforts in this 
regard.198 
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On 21 July 2008, the Serbian government arrested former Bosnian Serb leader 
Radovan Karadzic, a longtime high profile fugitive who successfully avoided capture for 
13 years.  Radovan Karadžić and General Ratko Mladić, the two most wanted war 
criminals, are under indictment for genocide and crimes against humanity perpetrated 
during the 1992-1995 Bosnian war.  General Ratko Mladić is still at large and has to date 
successfully escaped justice.  Full cooperation with the ICTY was a key requirement of 
external international organizations for the eventual membership of the western Balkan 
countries in the European Union and NATO.  The recent arrest of Karadžić proved this 
strategy successful. However, this pressure on countries for greater cooperation with the 
ICTY has occasionally come under criticism and has been characterized as unfair.199  
The Serbian government has recently shown closer cooperation with the ICTY.  
In June 2007 former General Zdravko Tolimir, a top aide to General Mladić, and 
Vlastimir Đorđević, a former Serbian police commander, were arrested and delivered to 
The Hague.  On 11 June 2008, Serbian authorities also arrested Stojan Župljanin, a 
security and police commander and aide to wartime Bosnian Serb leader Radovan 
Karadžić.  According to some analysts, Serbia’s ambitious drive to achieve EU 
membership candidacy resulted in the surprising arrest of Karadžić, which gave hope that 
two remaining indicted war crimes suspects, Ratko Mladić and Goran Hadžić, may also 
soon be arrested.  Ratko Mladić was commanding general of the Bosnian Serbs during 
the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Goran Hadžić is a former political leader of 
breakaway Serbs in Croatia.  
Cooperation with the ICTY is a necessary condition in order to attain full stability 
in both countries (Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina) and in the region.  Some 
observers believe that Western institutions have to find a way to sustain Serbia’s Western 
integration prospects and association in view of the implications of Kosovo’s declaration 
of independence in February 2008.  Others believe that the longstanding “conditional” 
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policy of the European Union needs to be maintained because it has proven to be the 
most effective tool to bring remaining war crimes suspects to justice.200 
D. CONCLUSION  
Defense reform is one of the most important steps toward NATO membership.  
The achievements in Bosnia and Herzegovina have been remarkable so far; however, the 
Bosnia and Herzegovina Armed Forces still require huge improvements in order to meet 
NATO standards.  Taking into consideration its limited military assets, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina has to decide on a field of specialization that it could offer to the Alliance 
and its partners as its niche contribution to world peace and security.201  Relations 
between Bosnia and Herzegovina and its neighbor countries ─ Croatia, Montenegro, and 
Serbia ─ are considered fairly stable, but there is still room for improvement.   
The profound internal crisis in Serbia since Kosovo’s February 2008 declaration 
of independence has had a remarkable influence on the situation in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, despite the repeated reaffirmations of many international officials that the 
Dayton Agreement is the strongest guarantor of Bosnia’s political and territorial integrity.  
Kosovo’s independence and possible secession attempts by the Republika Srpska may 
slow the process of NATO enlargement in this part of the Balkans.   
Regarding cooperation with the ICTY, there still remains a key question:  should 
Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia be integrated into NATO as soon as possible to 
promote stability and security in South-East Europe (and in order to capture the war 
crime suspects with the full use of the NATO apparatus) or should both these countries 
be required to first catch the most wanted suspects for trial by the  tribunal in The Hague 
by themselves as proof of their good intentions, before they are admitted to the Alliance? 
The most probable outcome may well be the latter, as the longstanding conditional policy  
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of the European Union has proven to be the most effective tool to bring war crimes 
suspects to justice.  Overall, regardless of its numerous obstacles, Bosnia and 
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V. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter offers a comparison of the case studies of Croatia and Bosnia and 
Herzegovina.  The similarity in the size of their territories and populations, and their 
common history within the same geo-strategic space, are the main reasons why Croatia 
has been chosen as a comparative case study to illuminate the circumstances of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina.  Croatia is also an example of a successful neighboring country on its 
way to NATO membership.  This fact gives further relevance to this comparative 
analysis.  In order to define the main challenges for Bosnia and Herzegovina related to 
NATO membership, this chapter explores the principal similarities and differences 
between the Croatia case study and the Bosnia and Herzegovina case study.  These two 
case studies are compared through an evaluation of two key variables:  defense reform 
and the foreign policies of these countries. 
B. DEFENSE REFORM 
1. Similarities 
• Both countries experienced the same kind of war within the same time 
framework and ended the war with similar war legacies that have had 
almost identical, usually negative, effects on the defense reform processes 
in both countries before and during their implementation.   
• The possibility of gaining EU and NATO membership was the driving 
force motivating both countries to initiate and implement defense reform.  
In each case NATO has been the main promoter of defense reform, mainly 
through its PfP and MAP mechanisms in which both countries are taking 
an active role.  Participation in these programs is crucial for these 
countries and has direct implications for the pace of defense reform. 
 76
• The Armed Forces of these countries were established during the war from 
a combination of the old system of the Yugoslav People’s Army and a 
slowly emerging indigenous system based on restricted offensive and 
territorially-based self-defense capabilities. These origins have had a 
negative influence on the creation of a new and totally different defense 
system based on a significantly different military doctrine. 
• The personnel structure of both Armed Forces was primarily the result of a 
poor personnel management system and the legacies of war.  Both Croatia 
and Bosnia and Herzegovina faced shortfalls in their military 
establishments such as an “aging force,” a lack of qualified personnel, 
inadequate personnel placement, and an inverted personnel pyramid─that 
is, disproportionate numbers of higher ranking officers in relation to other 
personnel. For both military establishments there have been huge 
consequences for the pace of defense reform. 
• The weapon systems and equipment in both countries are old and 
incompatible with NATO standards.  The uncontrolled import of military 
equipment and weapons during the war in 1991-1995 has resulted in a 
variety of different types and models of particular classes of weapons; and 
this has contributed to a low level of interoperability with NATO. 
• In order to develop Armed Forces with a well-balanced budget structure 
both countries have struggled to achieve the financial framework 
necessary for maintaining the capabilities required by NATO standards.  
The recommended allocation of 50% of the budget for personnel 
expenses, 30% for operational costs, and 20% for equipment has not been 
achieved yet in either country, nor has either Zagreb or Sarajevo attained 
the recommended defense budget allocation of 2% of the national Gross 




struggling to obtain sufficient funds and to gain wide political support for 
the whole society from the implementation phase of the defense reform 
process. 
2. Differences 
• Different internal political struggles within the countries in the post-
Dayton era resulted in an earlier consolidation of Croatia’s political elite 
and an earlier redirection of policy toward the EU and NATO than 
occurred in Bosnia and Herzegovina.  In Croatia it was Tudjman's regime 
that represented a key obstacle to Croatia's Euro-Atlantic integration; in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina problems with the implementation of the Dayton 
Peace Agreement resulted in the slow integration of the defense structures 
of Bosnia and Herzegovina.  This is the main reason why defense reform 
in Bosnia and Herzegovina started later, and why the pace of defense 
reform has been slower than in Croatia. 
• The different ethnic structures of the Armed Forces in Croatia and Bosnia 
and Herzegovina have provided different predispositions relating to the 
achievement of consensus in defense-related issues.  Achieving consensus 
in Croatia, with its Croat majority, is comparatively easy and prompt. 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, with two entities, three constitutive ethnic 
groups, and four religions, is a country where the achievement of 
consensus in defense matters is closely connected to other political 
decisions at the state level and is, indeed, a long process. 
• Comparing the difference in ethnic representation in the Croatian Armed 
Forces, in which the ethnic composition is comparatively homogeneous, 
with that in the Bosnia and Herzegovina Armed Forces, it is apparent that 
the latter is much more complex.  An over-emphasis on ethnic 
representation principles in BiH has resulted in increasingly hollow unit 
structures, because particular ethnic groups have not been able to provide 
sufficient numbers of personnel.  Furthermore, the necessity for balanced 
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ethnic representation in the command positions at all levels leads to the 
conclusion that the challenges for human resource management in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina are more sensitive and complex than those in Croatia.  
These challenges require decisions that will achieve balanced ethnic 
structures but without any loss of effectiveness in the performance of their 
duties. 
• The different levels of international involvement related to expertise in 
defense reform in these two countries have affected reform processes in 
various ways.  NATO has been the main promoter of defense reform in 
Croatia, together with the OSCE.  In Bosnia and Herzegovina the 
involvement of international organizations has been more intensive.  That 
is an indicator of how much more complex the situation has been in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina than in Croatia. Moreover, the presence of 
NATO forces (including IFOR, the Implementation Force, and SFOR, the 
Stabilization Force) and European Union forces (above all, EUFOR, the 
European Force) has positively affected integration processes within the 
military forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina before and after the initiation of 
the defense reform process.  
• Differences in the constitutions of these two countries have had effects 
related to defense property issues.  While Croatia did not have problems 
with movable and immovable defense property, the complex state system 
in Bosnia and Herzegovina, founded in the Dayton Accords, has been 
reflected in problems of transferring movable and immovable defense 
properties from the entity level to the state level.  These problems have 
had a huge influence on the implementation phase of the defense reform 
process in Bosnia and Herzegovina and have directly affected the 
readiness of the Armed Forces and the pace of defense reform in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina.  
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C. FOREIGN POLICIES 
1. Similarities 
• Both countries have demonstrated an ability and willingness to make a 
military contribution to the Alliance in order to fulfill the eligibility 
criteria for NATO membership.  Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina are 
fully committed to assigning units for operations outside their national 
territory, depending on their current capabilities and readiness.  They are 
particularly devoted to the development of military niche capabilities in 
order to contribute to the security of the Euro-Atlantic area.  
• Since the signing of the Dayton Agreement in 1995, relations among 
Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina and their neighbors have been fairly 
stable and have improved over time.  Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia 
have no major outstanding issues with their neighbors.  In order to 
strengthen their cooperation with NATO, both countries are committed to 
constructively act in order to resolve any specific issues with their 
neighbours as well as any pending issues between themselves.  
• The longstanding obligation of cooperation with the ICTY is a common 
characteristic of Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina.  Keeping in mind 
that this is a necessary obligation, these countries are fully committed to 
fulfilling all obligations related to the arrest and extradition of individuals 
accused of war crimes committed in the former Yugoslavia. 
2. Differences  
• Croatia has undertaken more extensive efforts than Bosnia and 
Herzegovina in peacekeeping missions.  Likewise, Croatia has participated 
in NATO-led operations.  Participation in NATO-led operations is more 
appreciated by the Alliance than any other contribution by a candidate for 
NATO membership.  Croatia intends to gradually increase its participation 
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in NATO-led missions while Bosnia and Herzegovina is committed to 
supporting NATO-led peacekeeping operations.  Bosnia and Herzegovina 
is willing to participate in the NATO-led mission in Afghanistan, but still 
is unable to do so due to its engagement in the coalition mission in Iraq 
and its preoccupation with the implementation phase of the defense 
reform. 
• Kosovo’s February 2008 declaration of independence has had a different 
impact on relations between Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia when 
compared to the impact on relations between Croatia and Serbia.  Croatia 
has recognized Kosovo in order to strengthen its relationship with the 
larger states of the European Union, while simultaneously jeopardizing 
good relations with Serbia.  However, Bosnia and Herzegovina has not 
recognized Kosovo as an independent country in order to maintain 
domestic stability and to counteract Republika Srpska's tendencies to 
secede from Bosnia and Herzegovina.  These implications of Kosovo’s 
independence for Bosnia and Herzegovina’s relations with Serbia are 
more sensitive than the implications for the relations between Croatia and 
Serbia.  Dealing with this issue will undoubtedly have an impact on 
relations between Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia in the long run.      
• Croatia has resolved the matter of ICTY cooperation and has thereby 
opened the road toward membership in Euro-Atlantic institutions, while 
the cooperation of Bosnia and Herzegovina with the ICTY is still 
considered unresolved.  Despite much criticism that this conditional status 
should not be applied to Bosnia and Herzegovina, the recent arrest of 
many “most wanted” persons accused of war crimes committed during the 
war in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1992-1995 has proved that this policy 
still works.   
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D. CONCLUSION 
The comparison of defense reform processes and foreign policies of Croatia and 
Bosnia and Herzegovina concludes that the similarities and differences between these 
nations provide important insights into the most critical areas in a country’s aspiration to 
NATO membership.  The experiences and lessons learned in Croatia could be used in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina as well.  The similarities in the defense reform processes 
confirm that all post-communist countries have common historical legacies that need 
time and adequate policies to overcome, while the differences highlight the areas that 
have to be analyzed more cautiously and thoroughly.  Similarities and differences in the 
foreign policies of Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina represent the complexity of 
contemporary international relations in a region which requires both a sensitive and 
comprehensive approach.  Overall, this comparative analysis serves as a foundation to 
define the main obstacles facing Bosnia and Herzegovina as it pursues NATO 
membership, and serves as a roadmap to the most effective solutions to overcome these 

















In 1992 Bosnia and Herzegovina seized the opportunity and chose to become an 
independent country in what has been recognized as a brave and correct choice by the 
rest of the world, considering the country’s long and complex history.  Unfortunately, in 
the 1990s, Bosnia and Herzegovina sank into a dark period of its history when genocide 
occurred in the heart of Europe.  In order to respond to the crisis in the Balkans, NATO 
redefined its own purposes and helped Bosnia and Herzegovina survive.  Bosnia and 
Herzegovina recognized in NATO an opportunity to build its own international position 
as a member of the Alliance.  In choosing a course for integration into the NATO 
Alliance, Bosnia and Herzegovina has encountered many challenges and obstacles.  
These obstacles and the recommended policies for surmounting them are as follows: 
• The NATO enlargement process itself has created some challenges to the 
Alliance, and the most prominent concern the cohesiveness of the Alliance 
and the risk of confrontation with Russia.  These challenges become more 
pressing as the Alliance grows larger.  In order to surmount this obstacle 
Bosnia and Herzegovina has to mobilize the country's entire society and 
thoroughly implement PfP programs.  The risk of a confrontation with 
Russia in the context of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s bid for NATO 
membership is not as influential as with respect to former Soviet republics.  
However, the tempo of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s journey toward NATO 
membership could be indirectly slowed down if NATO continues to 
postpone decisions on inviting Ukraine and Georgia to participate in the 
MAP process.  Bosnia and Herzegovina fits well in the NATO 
enlargement process, but it still has to actively lobby for a better position 
in the overall NATO enlargement process. The Bosnia and Herzegovina 
Mission to NATO in Brussels has to be strong for this reason.  
• By participating in the PfP program Bosnia and Herzegovina has initiated 
various activities that propel it forward.  NATO and other international 
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organizations are consistently the main promoters and play a leading role 
in the overall reform process.  The external international organizations 
have fostered a situation in which progress is expected to begin based 
exclusively on their initiative.  Bosnia and Herzegovina has to take the 
initiative in the overall reform process, and undertake proactive measures 
within the PfP mechanisms. Sarajevo should actively participate in and 
organize affordable programs and exercises according to its own 
capacities.  Bosnia and Herzegovina has the requisite expertise and ability 
to take the initiative in certain domains on the way to NATO membership; 
and such a vigorous approach is necessary if Bosnia and Herzegovina 
really wants to expedite movement toward NATO membership.  The 
NATO Co-ordination Team (NCT) should be used as the main hub of 
initiative in order to surmount this obstacle and provide the synergy of 
employing the entire state apparatus to move toward NATO membership. 
• European and Euro-Atlantic international organizations and Bosnia and 
Herzegovina have made considerable efforts to adopt all the laws 
necessary for the normal functioning of the defense system in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina.  However, Bosnia and Herzegovina currently has no plan 
related to the future development and modernization of its Armed Forces, 
which presents a significant obstacle for NATO membership.  In order to 
glean insight into the future Bosnia and Herzegovina has to perform a 
Strategic Defense Review (SDR) to determine the current state of its 
Armed Forces.  The main precursor to this is the establishment of a 
defense planning system on the levels of strategic planning, developmental 
planning and operative planning.  Strategic planning documents would 
include: the National Security Strategy, the Defense Strategy, the Military 
Strategy and the Strategic Review of the Status of Military Capabilities.  
Development planning documents would include a Long Term 
Development Plan covering a period of ten years and a Mid Term 
Development Plan covering a period of six years.  Operative planning 
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documents would cover the management of personnel and material 
resources and directly connect the planning functions with programming 
and budget development.  These documents will enable Bosnia and 
Herzegovina to achieve the main preconditions for stable and speedy 
movement toward NATO membership. 
• As a consequence of wartime legacies, Bosnia and Herzegovina inherited 
shortfalls such as an “aging force,” a lack of qualified personnel, 
inadequate personnel placement, and an inverted personnel pyramid (a 
disproportionate number of higher ranking officers in relation to other 
personnel), which present an obstacle to NATO membership.  As the next 
priority Bosnia and Herzegovina has to establish a Human Resource 
Management (HRM) system that will establish an effective personnel 
policy in order to have qualified personnel in the appropriate positions and 
thereby facilitate further development.  Principles of ethnic representation 
have to be respected within the HRM system, but to the degree that 
appropriate qualifications for certain positions are met without 
jeopardizing the functional effectiveness of the Armed Forces.      
• The lack of a standardized military education system in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina poses a significant obstacle for the country on its way toward 
NATO membership.  Bosnia and Herzegovina currently plans to have 
military education systems organized in a way that would provide highly 
educated and trained personnel capable of speaking NATO’s official 
languages – English and French.  In order to establish an effective military 
education system Bosnia and Herzegovina has to develop and implement a 
system based on the existing civilian education system combined with 
basic military training.  Bosnia and Herzegovina also has to make full use 
of opportunities for professional development and specialized training in 
allied countries, various military programs offered by the United States, 
and the NATO/PfP training and education system, including the Peace 
Support Operations Training Centre (PSOTC) in Sarajevo.   
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• Modernization of equipment and weapon systems in the Armed Forces of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina is one of the main challenges for NATO 
membership.  Affordability for the country and compatibility with NATO 
standards are the most important requisites for future development.  
Existing equipment and weapons are generally old and incompatible with 
NATO standards.  The uncontrolled import of military equipment and 
weapons has resulted in a variety of different types and models of 
particular classes of weapons.  Bosnia and Herzegovina has to find a way 
to modernize its armed forces and to increase the level of interoperability 
with NATO members.  In order to achieve this goal, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina has to actively take advantage of its membership in the 
NATO PfP program.  The Strategic Defense Review (SDR) of the Armed 
Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina has to identify the main challenges 
within the current materiel management system in relation to the vision of 
the desired niche capabilities that Bosnia and Herzegovina wants to 
develop in order to properly focus its future procurement and 
modernization efforts.  These efforts will be addressed in the next step, the 
creation of the Long Term Development Plan (LTDP) of the Armed 
Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina.  This requires the allocation of 
financial resources that will be guaranteed by the state and implemented 
through a well-balanced budget structure.  Bosnia and Herzegovina should 
explore possibilities to finance deployments of military units outside the 
national territory from budgets other than the defense budget.  This would 
enable the government to provide more consistent funding for the 
improvement of the training, equipment and modernization of the Armed 
Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
• The defense property of Bosnia and Herzegovina presents a huge 
challenge for the country.  This obstacle has to be surmounted by action at 
the highest levels under the initiative of the Council of Ministers of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina in order to define competences between the entity and 
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the state levels.  The defense system in Bosnia and Herzegovina is 
organized on the state level, and therefore the state has to have control 
over defense property in order to perform its role. 
• Participation in NATO-led peacekeeping missions remains the main 
priority in order to demonstrate Bosnia and Herzegovina’s ability and 
willingness to make a military contribution to security in the Euro-Atlantic 
area.  The LTDP has to present the vision of certain niche capabilities that 
Bosnia and Herzegovina will develop.  Bosnia and Herzegovina has to be 
able to achieve a level of readiness such that 8%  (800 personnel) of the 
active land component will be deployed or be ready to be deployed to 
international military operations, while 40% (4,000 personnel) will 
possess capabilities to participate in operations outside the territory of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina.  Bosnia and Herzegovina should be able to 
develop units suitable for participation in NATO-led operations such as:  
an infantry platoon, an engineers’ platoon for mine clearing, an Explosive 
Ordnance Disposal (EOD) platoon, a military police platoon, a special 
operations platoon, a Nuclear-Biological-Chemical (NBC) platoon for 
decontamination measures, medical teams, and a crew with a transport 
helicopter.  In order to achieve this goal, participation in NATO−led 
peacekeeping missions has to be the highest priority in the mission set of 
the Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
• Maintaining and improving relations with neighboring countries will 
continue to be a challenge for Bosnia and Herzegovina in the future.  The 
history of the Balkans shows that stability in this part of the world has 
always been fragile and needs constant upkeep.  Bosnia and Herzegovina 
has both internal and external challenges relating to relations with its 
neighbors.  Internal issues in Bosnia and Herzegovina are usually related 
to external influences and, as such, have to be remedied.  Bosnia and 
Herzegovina has to deal with the recognition of Kosovo as an independent 
country with exceptional attention. Sarajevo’s diplomacy in this regard 
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will be highly dependent on developments in the political landscape in 
Serbia. Serbia will have to make its own historic choice either for a better 
future as part of the European Union (and other European and Euro-
Atlantic institutions) or for isolation, stagnation and decline.  That choice 
will significantly affect the future prospects of this part of Europe.  
Although Bosnia and Herzegovina has much less influence than Serbia in 
dealing with this issue, Bosnia and Herzegovina still has to put significant 
effort into improving relations with neighboring countries and influencing 
the crucial areas requiring cooperation−economic, cultural, and political.  
With a view to strong cooperation within NATO, Bosnia and Herzegovina 
has to be committed to constructively acting to resolve specific issues with 
its neighbors. 
• Cooperation with the ICTY (International Criminal Tribunal for Former 
Yugoslavia) remains the main obstacle for Bosnia and Herzegovina as a 
longstanding condition for NATO membership.  Bosnia and Herzegovina 
has shown a strong willingness to cooperate with the ICTY, but obviously 
this cooperation does not depend only on Bosnia and Herzegovina itself.  
Bosnia and Herzegovina has to continue to fully support international and 
domestic institutions in order to find, arrest, and deliver suspected war 
criminals to the ICTY.  It is hoped that General Ratko Mladić, the primary 
obstacle for Bosnia and Herzegovina on the way to NATO membership, 
will soon be arrested, as was the case with his political leader Radovan 
Karadžić. 
In conclusion, this thesis has shown that Croatia has made significant efforts in 
defense reform and foreign policy in order to join NATO; however, it is also evident that 
the CAF (Croatian Armed Forces) are still not ready for employment in the full spectrum 
of NATO missions.  NATO's decision to invite Croatia to join the Alliance is founded on 
the assessment that, although militarily Croatia is not yet ready to undertake all missions, 
it has the potential for greater contributions in the future.  It appears that the declaration 
of independence by Kosovo in February 2008, combined with the politico-strategic 
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situation in the region, may have helped to open the door for Croatia’s membership in the 
Alliance, as the NATO Allies wish to promote regional stability.   
A similar scenario could apply to Bosnia and Herzegovina. That is, the politico-
strategic situation in the region could play to the advantage of Bosnia and Herzegovina.  
The main challenges and obstacles for Bosnia and Herzegovina in its pursuit of NATO 
membership have been identified and analyzed, and recommendations for their resolution 
have been suggested.  Clearly Bosnia and Herzegovina faces more obstacles and 
challenges on its way to NATO membership than have been analyzed in this thesis.  The 
variables considered in this thesis are, however, among the critical ones.  The Alliance’s 
1995 Study on NATO Enlargement has clarified a set of principles and requirements as 
the basis of NATO’s approach to inviting new members.  Bosnia and Herzegovina is well 
on its way to meeting these requirements and surmounting all the challenges and 
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Figure 4.    Komarna- Pelješac Bridge205 (From: 205) 
                                                 
205See: http://www.edubrovnik.org/most_kopno_peljesac/most_s_pristupnim_cestama.pdf ; (accessed 
3 October 2008) 
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Figure 5.   Organizational Structure of the Bosnia and Herzegovina Armed Forces in 2003206 
(From: 206) 
                                                 
206 Defense Reform Commission, The Path to Partnership for Peace, 11.  
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APPENDIX F  
 
Figure 6.   Organizational Structure of the Bosnia and Herzegovina Armed Forces in 2005207 
(From: 207) 
                                                 
207 Bosnia and Herzegovina Armed Forces Structure, Bosnia and Herzegovina Ministry of Defense, 
http://www.mod.gov.ba/eng/eng_jstaff.html (accessed 24 August, 2008).  
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Milojčić, Miladin. Major General, Deputy Chief of the Joint Staff for Resources. 
Background interview by author. Sarajevo, 2 July 2008. 
 
Pleh, Rizvo. Brigadier General, Inspector General in the Ministry of Defense of Bosnia 
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